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Unlike the constitutions of many nations, such as the United States of 
America and the Republic of South Africa, the constitutions of the 
Australian States and Territories and the Commonwealth Constitution Act 
1901 (UK) contain no bill of rights. Australia is the only western democracy 
without a federal bill of rights. The debate regarding the need for a bill of 
rights necessitates an understanding of what human rights the people of 
Australia already enjoy. If sufficient protection can be found in existing 
sources, does Australia really need a federal bill of rights? Opponents of a 
bill of rights state that we have sufficient protection from arbitrary 
government intervention in our personal affairs and thus a bill of rights is 
unnecessary. There are a number of potential sources of human rights in 
Australia that might provide the suggested existing protection, including the 
common law, specific domestic legislation, international law and 
constitutional law. Each of these sources of human rights has, however, 
important limitations. The focus of this article is on the inadequacy of the 
Australian constitutions as a source of purported protection. This in turn 
suggests that an alternative source of rights is needed – a federal bill of 
rights? In the course of this analysis the author makes suggestions for 
reform; specifically how a federal bill of rights may address the paucity of 
constitutional protection. 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike the constitutions of many nations, such as the United States of 
America and the Republic of South Africa, the constitutions of the Australian 
States and Territories and the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901 (UK) 
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(‘Constitution’) contain no bill of rights.
1
 Australia is the only western 
democracy without a federal bill of rights.
2
 This has been a matter of great 
debate for some time, a debate recently
3
 re-ignited by the adoption of 
legislative human rights charters in the State of Victoria
4
 and the Australian 
Capital Territory.
5
 These developments have led commentators to consider 
whether the federal government should follow suit and adopt either a 
legislative, or a constitutional, bill of rights. The contemporary relevance of 
this issue has been heightened with the recent election (November 2007) of 
the Rudd Labor federal government. The previous Howard Liberal/National 
coalition government was openly suspicious of, and hostile to, the 
introduction of a bill of rights instrument.
6
 
 
A Hollow Denials that there is a Problem 
 
The debate regarding the need for a bill of rights necessitates an 
understanding of what human rights the people of Australia already enjoy. If 
sufficient protection can be found in existing sources, does Australia really 
need a federal bill of rights? Opponents of a bill of rights state that we have 
sufficient protection from arbitrary government intervention in our personal 
affairs and thus a bill of rights is unnecessary.
7
 Such persons declare, ‘our 
                                                
1
 As Dawson J noted in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 61 the ‘Constitution does 
not contain a Bill of Rights. Indeed the 1898 Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal to 
include an express guarantee of individual rights...’ 
2
 See R Cassin, ‘Who’s afraid of a bill of rights?’, The Age (Melbourne), 17 December 2005, 
26; ‘Protecting the inalienable rights of citizens’, The Age (Melbourne), 24 July 2006, 12; H 
Charlesworth, M Chiam, D Hovell and G Williams, No Country is an Island: Australia and 
International Law (2006) 64; M McHugh, Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights? (2007) New 
South Wales Bar Association <www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/resources/lectures/bill_rights.pdf> at 
10 October 2008. 
3
 A Anderson, ‘The wrongs of pushing a Bill of Rights’, The Age, (Melbourne), 4 January 
2005, 13; J Burnside, ‘It’s time to uphold our rights’, The Age, (Melbourne), 14 December 
2006, 21; Cassin, above n 2; R Clement, ‘Why we don’t need a bill of rights’, The Age, 
(Melbourne), 30 March 2006; ‘Protecting the inalienable rights of citizens’, The Age, 
(Melbourne), 24 July 2006, 12; C Evans and S Evans, ‘Charter a step forward in protecting 
human rights’, The Age, (Melbourne), 22 December 2005, 15; R Hulls, ‘Bill of Rights: What’s 
‘wrong’ with protecting our basic rights?’, The Age, (Melbourne), 6 January 2006; P Lynch, 
‘Getting it right on human rights’, The Age, (Melbourne), 13 March 2006; A Mason, ‘Rights 
bill a matter for judgment’, The Age, (Melbourne), 29 March 2006; F Shiel, ‘Victoria to get 
human rights charter’, The Age, (Melbourne), 21 December 2005, 9. 
4
 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
5
 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). 
6
 See Cassin, above n 2; ‘Protecting the inalienable rights of citizens’, above n 3; M Saunders, 
‘PM won’t pick up Fraser’s Bill’, Weekend Australian, (Sydney), 26 August 2000, 5. 
7
 Anderson, above n 3; Clement, above n 3; P Faris, ‘Lawyers’ picnic for your rights’, Herald 
Sun, (Melbourne) 1 January 2008, 16. 
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basic rights and freedoms in Australia [are] well protected …’
8
 These 
commentators assert that ‘here in Melbourne, Mildura, or Maryborough in 
[2008], we’re ok, we don’t have the human rights abuses faced by people in 
other countries’.
9
 
 
However, empirical evidence indicates that the traditional reliance on the 
common law and responsible government as the ultimate guardians of human 
rights is no longer sufficient.
10
 Australian society has recently experienced an 
erosion of civil liberties. Anti-terrorism laws,
11
 for example, now authorise 
acts contrary to the fundamental civil rights
12
 that underpin the legal and 
procedural limitations to the police force’s general investigatory and 
detention powers. Most recently we have seen control orders being imposed 
                                                
8
 Faris, above n 7. 
9
 D Sisely, ‘Safeguarding the rights of all Victorians’, The Age, (Melbourne), 28 December 
2007, 19. 
10
 See M Gordon, ‘Fraser backs bill of rights’, The Age, (Melbourne), 25 August 2000, 1; N 
Meagher, ‘Rights bill bolsters politicians’, The Australian, (Sydney), 10 January 2001, 11. 
11
 The primary federal anti-terrorism laws are contained in Schedule 1, Part 5.3 (Terrorism), 
Divisions 100-104, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and Part 1AA, Division 3A Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth). The former legislation details relevant criminal acts. The latter contains relevant 
police powers pertaining to search and seizure, questioning, arrest and denial of bail and non-
parole periods. Division 104 provides for the imposition of control orders. Part II Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) also includes offences in regard to unlawful associations. For further legislation see 
the extremely comprehensive parliamentary library site: Parliamentary Library, Terrorism Law 
(2008) Parliament of Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/terrorism.htm> at 
10 October 2008. 
12
 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Inquiry into the Anti-terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) Parliament of Australia 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/terrorism/submissions/sub139.pdf> at 10 October 2008; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Inquiry into the Anti-terrorism Bill 
(No 2) 2005 (2005) Parliament of Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/ 
legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/terrorism/submissions/sub140.pdf> at 10 October 
2008; A Lynch and G Williams, What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s Anti-Terror 
Law (2006); J von Doussa, ‘Reconciling human rights and counter-terrorism – a crucial 
challenge’ (Paper presented at The Annual James Cook University Mayo Lecture, 12 
September 2006), <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/speeches/speeches_president/2006/ 
mayo_lecture.html> at 10 October 2008; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Review of the 
Power to Proscribe Terrorist Organisations (2007) Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission 
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/legal/submissions/2007/proscription_powers_terrorist_org_feb2007
.html> at 10 October 2008; G Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights: Freedom in 
the War on Terror (2004), 27-8; M McHugh, ‘Terrorism Legislation and the Constitution’ 
(2006) 28 Australian Bar Review 117; McHugh, above n 2. 
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on Jack Thomas
13
 and David Hicks
14
 under these anti-terrorism laws. The 
ability to impose such control orders provides a specific example of the 
tension between anti-terrorism laws and individual rights and liberties in 
Australia.
15
 Further, despite the report of the government-appointed Security 
Legislation Review Committee that aspects of these anti-terrorism laws, in 
particular those relating to banned organisations and the offence of 
associating with a banned organisation, breached fundamental human rights, 
the former federal government refused to repeal or amend them.
16
 
 
Immigration laws provide a further contemporary example of the derogation 
from human rights protection.
17
 Such laws authorise the mistreatment of 
                                                
13
 On 28 August 2007 the first control order was made by the Federal Magistrates Court in 
relation to Jack Thomas. Particularly relevant in the context of this article, which focuses on 
the paucity of existing constitutional protections, such control orders were recently held to be 
constitutionally valid: Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194. See further B Jagers, Anti-
terrorism control orders in Australia and the United Kingdom: a comparison (Parliamentary 
Library, Research Paper No. 28 2007-2008) (2008) Parliament of Australia <www.aph.gov.au/ 
library/pubs/RP/2007-08/08RP28.htm> at 10 October 2008. 
14
 Jabbour v Hicks [2007] FMCA 2139. See further Jagers, above n 13. 
15
 See Kirby J’s dissent in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194. See also Civil Liberties 
Australia, ‘Kirby delivers dissenting masterpiece’ (www.cla.asn.au); Amnesty International 
Australia, Australia: Draconian laws in action undermine Australia’s human rights 
obligations (2006) Amnesty International Australia <http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/ 
comments/277/> at 10 October 2008; von Doussa, above n 12; Australian Lawyers for Human 
Rights, above n 12; Lynch and Williams, above n 12; Jagers, above n 13. 
16
 Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation Review 
Committee (2006) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F 
94816C2AF4AA2645824B)~SLRC+Report-
+Version+for+15+June+2006%5B1%5D.pdf/$file/SLRC+Report-
+Version+for+15+June+2006%5B1%5D.pdf>. See also Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, above n 12. The Australian Law Reform Commission has also called for the 
repeal of the sedition laws, enacted as part of the then federal government’s anti-terrorism 
laws: Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting words; A Review of Sedition Laws in 
Australia, Report No 104 (2006) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ other/alrc/publications/ 
reports/104/ALRC104.pdf>. Note that the United Kingdom legislation, including detention 
powers under s 23 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) and control orders 
under s 1(1) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) have been held by the House of Lords to 
effect a deprivation of liberty in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): A(FC) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45. See also Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB 
[2007] UKHL 46; Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] UKHL 47. See 
further D Feldham, ‘Deprivation of Liberty in Anti-Terrorism Law’ [2008] Cambridge Law 
Journal 4; von Doussa, above n 12. 
17
 See further HREOC, Summary of Observations following the Inspection of Mainland 
Immigration Detention Facilities 2007 (2007) HREOC <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/ 
Human_RightS/immigration/idc2007.html> at 10 October 2008; HREOC, Human Rights and 
International Law Implications of Migration Bills (2001) HREOC <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/ 
2008                                                                     Time for a Federal Bill of Rights? 135 
asylum seekers in breach of international law
18
 through, inter alia, arbitrary 
indefinite detention. The previous Liberal/National coalition government 
ignored reports by, among others, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, that its 
detention regime breached international law.
19
 The current Australian 
Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Senator Chris Evans, has stated that 
247 people have been identified as having been wrongly detained under 
immigration laws.
20
 In recent times these detention powers were misused on 
at least two Australian residents. Cornelia Rau was wrongly detained as an 
illegal immigrant for almost a year when she was mistaken by immigration 
authorities for a German tourist.
21
 Vivian Alvarez Solon, an Australian 
citizen, was wrongly detained and then deported to the Philippines, despite 
health concerns, because she appeared to be a Filipina.
22
 It appears that the 
vulnerable in our society, whether mentally ill,
23
 homeless,
24
 members of 
                                                                                                               
HUMAN_RIGHTS/immigration/migration_bills.html> at 10 October 2008; McHugh, above n 
2. 
18
 These include Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’), Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
(‘CROC’) and Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment Regarding the Situation of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers (1999). 
See further HREOC, above n 17; A Sathanapally, ‘Asylum Seekers, Ordinary Australians and 
Human Rights’ (Working Paper 3, Australian Human Rights Centre, 2004). 
19
 See further HREOC, above n 17; J Burnside, ‘Australia's treatment of asylum seekers: The 
view from outside’ (Speech delivered on World Refuge Day, Parliament House, 2003) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/08/1057430195786.html> at 10 October 2008. See 
also Charlesworth et al., above n 2. 
20
 Senator C Evans, ‘Address to the 2008 National Members’ Conference of the Migration 
Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal’ (Speech delivered at the 2008 National 
Member’s Conference of the Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Reveiw Tribunal, 
Melbourne, 29 February 2008) <www.chrisevans.alp.org.au/news/0208/immispeeches29-
01.php> at 13 October 2008. 
21
 See M Palmer, Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Cornelia 
Rau (2005) <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/pdf/palmer-report.pdf> at 13 October 
2008; Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, The Detention of Cornelia Rau; legal 
issues, Research Brief No 14 (2004-05) <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/RB/2004-
05/05rb14.pdf> at 13 October 2008. 
22
 See Palmer, above n 21; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Inquiry into the Circumstances of the 
Vivian Alvarez Matter, (Report No 3 of 2005) <http://www.comb.gov.au/commonwealth/ 
publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/reports_2005_03_dimia.pdf/$FILE/alvarez_report03.pdf> at 
13 October 2008. See also Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
Response to the Recommendations of the Report of the Commonwealth Ombudsman of the 
Inquiry Into the Circumstances of the Vivian Alvarez Matter, (Canberra, October 2005); 
Victorian Immigrant and Refugee Women’s Coalition, ‘Viviantimeline’ (www.virwc.org.au). 
The Age newspaper has reported that an elderly dementia sufferer was recently wrongly 
detained consequent on her lack of English language skills, which had led immigration 
authorities to believe that she was an illegal immigrant: Sisely, above n 9. 
23
 See McHugh, above n 2. 
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marginalised ethnic/religious groups
25
 or indigenous
26
 Australians, are those 
most impacted upon by the paucity of effective human rights protections in 
Australia.
27
 
 
Even the mistreatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees, such as the Australian 
David Hicks, is relevant to the contemporary mistrust of the sufficiency of 
existing human rights protections. Leaving aside the arguable general 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions (1949) and Protocols (1977), in some 
cases detainees have been held at Guantanamo Bay for years without being 
charged with any offence,
28
 arguably contrary to, inter alia, international 
law’s prohibition against arbitrary imprisonment.
29
 There have also been 
allegations of torture of the detainees,
30
 contrary to international law’s 
                                                                                                               
24
 See McHugh, ibid. 
25
 The Muslim community, for example, has suffered considerable discrimination generally, 
but particularly since the introduction of the above anti-terrorism laws. See Australian Muslim 
Civil Rights Advocacy Network, New Anti-terror Laws and the Muslim Community - a plain 
English explanation (2005) Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network 
<http://lexus.websitewelcome.com/~amcran/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
89&Itemid=41> at 14 October 2008; HREOC, Annual Report 2006-2007, Ch 9 Race 
Discrimination 
<http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/annual_reports/2006_2007/pdf/hreoc_ar2
006-07.pdf> at 14 October 2008. 
26
 See further the discussion below of the need for protection of aboriginal rights in a federal 
bill of rights. 
27
 See Williams, above n 12, 26; McHugh, above n 2. 
28
 In regard to the Australian detainees, Mr David Hicks was held for more than five years 
without legitimate charges and Mr Mamdouh Habib was held for more than two years without 
charge prior to his relatively recent release. See further McHugh, above n 2; Senator Linda 
Kirk ‘David Hicks has been detained at Guantanamo Bay US Military base in Cuba without 
charge for over a year’ (Press Release, 17 March 2003). Note that Jack Thomas, the subject of 
the first control order made in Australia under new anti-terrorism laws, was held by Pakistani 
authorities for five months without charge. United Kingdom estimates suggest that more than 
490 detainees are held in Guantanamo Bay: BBC News, UK calls for Guantanamo closure 
(2006) BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4759317.stm> at 14 October 2008. 
29
 See Rodriguez-Fernandez v Wilkinson 505 F Supp 787 (D Kan 1980) 800; Forti v Suarez-
Mason 672 F Supp 1531 (ND Cal 1987) 1541. Labor Senator for South Australia, Senator 
Kirk, noted ‘Guilty or not, David Hicks cannot be kept in indefinite detention without charge. 
To do so is a fundamental breach of human rights’: Kirk, above n 28. 
30
 Detainees have allegedly been starved, forced into stress positions for lengthy periods and 
more recently accusations have arisen of forcible drug sedation at the hands of US military 
intelligence officers. In a confidential report in June 2004 the International Committee of the 
Red Cross reported to the United States government that the treatment of prisoners was 
tantamount to torture. See further UC Davis Center for the Study of Human Rights in the 
Americas, ICRC: Analysis (2007) UC Davis Center for the Study of Human Rights in the 
Americas <http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/ 
testimonies/testimonies-of-the-red-cross/icrc-analysis/> at 14 October 2008. Amnesty 
International has received a massive number of reports in regard to the abuse and torture of 
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prohibition of state torture.
31
 Again, relevant to the subject analysis, the 
United States’ Bill of Rights 1791 protection against detention without charge 
ensures that no United States citizens are held in Guantanamo Bay, and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) protection of the right to a fair trial 
underpinned the successful negotiation for the release of English 
Guantanamo Bay detainees.
32
 These United States and United Kingdom 
instruments have no Australian counterpart. 
 
B Current Purported Protections and their 
 Inadequacy – Plan of the Article 
 
What then are the sources of law that the opponents of a bill of rights believe 
sufficiently protect Australians against such abuses? Protection for human 
rights might be expected from various legal sources in Australia, including 
the common law, specific domestic legislation, international law, and State 
and federal constitutional law. Whilst this article is primarily concerned with 
constitutional law protections, this analysis is part of a broader debate and the 
article begins with a brief discussion of each of these sources. The common 
law and specific legislation are wanting in this regard, and the effect of 
international law is uncertain. 
 
The article then turns to constitutional law. The constitutions of the 
Australian States essentially
33
 contain no human rights guarantees. Moreover, 
the guarantees provided by the Commonwealth Constitution are not only 
limited, but have generally been read down by the judiciary, leaving them 
ineffective. This article re-examines four federal constitutional ‘protections’ 
that particularly demonstrate this lack of efficacy:
34
  
                                                                                                               
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and has called for its closure: Amnesty International, USA: 
Close Guantanamo and disclose the rest (2005) Amnesty International 
<http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511012005?open&of=ENG-2AM> at 
14 October 2008. See also Amnesty International, USA: Guantanamo detainees must not be 
returned to more abuse (2005) Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ 
info/AMR51/121/2005> at 14 October 2008. 
31See Filartiga v Pena-Irala 630 F 2d 876 (1980), 885; Forti v Suarez-Mason 672 F Supp 
1531 (N D Cal 1987), 1541. Such allegations would also be contrary to the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
32Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’ (Speech delivered at the 
Royal United Services Institute Conference) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/ 
4760031.stm> 14 October 2008. 
33
 Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) s 46 guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion. 
34
 In light of the existing literature that provides a general commentary on the relevant law 
regarding these provisions, this article succinctly identifies key limitations that emerge from 
the case law and provides a critical analysis of the existing law. For a more detailed discussion 
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• the right to have property acquired on just terms: section 51(xxxi); 
• the right to a jury trial: section 80; 
• freedom of religion: section 116; and 
• freedom from interstate discrimination: section 117.  
 
Given the paucity of explicit constitutional protections, the article goes on to 
pose a further question, namely whether the framework of the Constitution 
may provide implied rights that serve as a further source of constitutional 
protection. It will be seen, however, that the courts have generally taken a 
constrictive approach to these implied limitations and that the very existence 
of some of these implied constitutional rights is in doubt. These implied 
protections certainly do not provide an effective source of human rights 
protection. 
 
In the course of this constitutional analysis it is suggested that an alternative 
source of rights is needed – a federal bill of rights. In the context of each of 
the above constitutional protections reform suggestions are made, drawing 
on, inter alia, the United States’ Bill of Rights (1791), the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and the Charter of Rights 
and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic). 
 
The need for a bill of rights is also suggested by the historical discrimination 
against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia under the Constitution. A glaring 
hole in the Constitution exists: the absence of any provision protecting 
Aboriginal rights. In fact, it will be seen that the Constitution was originally 
drafted to facilitate discrimination against the Aboriginal peoples of 
Australia. The author contends that the suggested bill of rights should include 
protections that are specifically aimed at protecting Aboriginal rights.  
 
Finally, the article concludes by placing this analysis in its broader context in 
regard to whether Australia should adopt a federal bill of rights. To this end 
the article briefly considers the implications of the analysis in deciding 
whether Australia should adopt a federal bill of rights.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
of existing case law see further P Hanks, P Keyzer and J Clarke, Australian Constitutional 
Law: Materials and Commentary (7th ed, 2004); T Blackshield and G Williams, Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (4th ed, 2006). See also McHugh, 
above n 2. 
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II SOURCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA 
- NON-CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES 
 
What are the sources of law that the opponents of a bill of rights believe 
sufficiently protect Australians against human rights abuses? There are a 
number, including the common law, specific domestic legislation, 
international law and constitutional law. Each of these sources of law has, 
however, important limitations.  
 
A Common Law 
 
Common law protections are quite limited and generally are not in the form 
of express statements of rights. They rather involve protective presumptions 
utilised in statutory interpretation
35
 or assumptions of liberties in areas where 
such liberties are not prohibited by law.
36
 Obviously, these presumptions 
utilised in statutory interpretation are rebuttable and may be overridden by 
clear legislation.
37
 Furthermore, in limited cases the common law recognises 
substantive rights, for example, the right to a fair trial.
38
 However, even these 
‘rights’ are subject to legislative abrogation.
39
 For example, the right to a fair 
trial, as stated in Dietrich v R,
40
 was partially legislatively reversed by the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), section 360A. 
 
B Domestic Legislation 
 
Further human rights protections can be found in specific pieces of domestic 
legislation. Well-known examples of these include the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth), the Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (SA), the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) and the 
Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic). These specific legislative protections are 
                                                
35
 See further J Spigelman, ‘The Common Law Bill of Rights’ (Lecture delivered at 2008 
McPherson Lectures, University of Queensland, 10 March 2008) <www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ 
lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/spigelman100308.pdf/$file/spigelman100308.pdf> at 
14 October 2008. 
36
 Constitutional Commission, Final Report of the Constitutional Commission (1988), 447; 
McHugh, above n 2. 
37
 See further Spigelman, above n 35. 
38
 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J), 326 (Deane J); Re Tracey; Ex parte 
Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 579 (Deane J); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 
493 (Gaudron J). 
39
 Obviously, the interpretative presumptions are rebuttable presumptions that may also be 
overridden by clear legislation. See further Spigelman, above n 35. 
40
 (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
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generally
41
 limited in subject matter, particularly to cases of racial and sexual 
discrimination,
42
 rather than protecting all basic civil liberties.  
 
Moreover, as they are legislatively based, these protections are subject to 
government’s legislative powers. For example, the operation of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was excluded by amendments to the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth)
43
 that allow for, inter alia, the racially discriminatory 
extinguishment
44
 of Aboriginal title since the decision in Wik Peoples v 
Queensland.
45
 Apart from very specific legislative amendments that favoured 
the interests of, among others, mining and pastoralist concerns to the 
detriment of Aboriginal peoples, the legislation also contains explicit 
statements suspending the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth). For example, section 7(2) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) expressly 
provides that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) does not apply to the 
validation of past acts that have abrogated native title rights under the Native 
Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). 
 
More recently, the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was 
again excluded by the Liberal/National coalition government in order to 
facilitate its intervention in Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. 
Section 132(2) of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 
2007 (Cth) (NTNER Act) excludes any acts done under the Act from the 
operation of Part II of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). It is beyond 
                                                
41
 Leaving aside the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). These, of course, are limited by the territorial boundaries of 
their respective jurisdictions. 
42
 See for example, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Sexual Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth). Even more generic legislation, such as the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW) is quite specific as to the categories of discrimination prohibited under the Act. 
43
 Through the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). 
44
 That facilitating the extinguishment of aboriginal title is in itself racially discriminatory is 
not only self-evident, but supported by precedent. In Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 
(‘Mabo 1’) the High Court held that the singling out of aboriginal title for legislative 
extinguishment under the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985 (Qld) offended the 
principle of equality found in s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). As the rights 
protected by this provision include the right to own and inherit property, the arbitrary 
extinguishment of aboriginal title was held to be contrary to the Act. Subsequently, in Western 
Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 (‘Native Title case’) the High Court held that 
the conversion of the aboriginal title to a diminished statutory form of title under s 7 Land 
(Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 1993 (WA) was also contrary to the right of equality 
protected by s 10 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). As affirmed in Attorney-General (NT) 
v Ward [2003] FCAFC 283, [117] the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is breached where 
a law provides for ‘differential treatment of land holding according to race’ and aboriginal title 
‘characteristically is held by members of a particular race’. 
45
 (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
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the scope of this article to discuss the appropriateness of the intervention. As 
is implicit in section 132(2) of the NTNER Act, the intervention is racially 
discriminatory. The legislation impacts only on Aboriginal communities and 
Aboriginal lands
46
 and thus involves an unlawful
47
 distinction on the basis of 
race. Thus, contemporary events suggest that existing legislative provisions 
are not sufficient to protect the rights of, particularly, politically marginalised 
parts of Australian society, such as Aboriginal Australians. 
 
C International Law 
 
International law provides a further potential source of human rights 
protection in Australia. Today innumerable declarations, instruments, 
protocols and treaties protecting human rights exist.
48
 Again, however, there 
are important barriers to international law providing effective protection to 
individuals. International law has traditionally been seen as the domain of 
nation states and not individuals.
49
 Moreover, individuals continue to face 
procedural hurdles when seeking to enforce international human rights 
norms. In particular Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice 1945, which provides for locus standi before the ICJ, states 
that ‘Only states may be parties before the Court’.
50
 While individuals may 
                                                
46
 See further Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth). 
47
 In breach of s 9 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).  
48
 Some of the major international treaties include: Charter of the United Nations 1945; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 1948; Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of Armed 
Conflict 1949 and Protocols 1977; European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (as amended 
by Protocol 11, 1998); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966; Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979; Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
2007. 
49
 See especially the works of Oppenheim, the chief exponent of the traditional theory. He 
asserts that an ‘individual human being ... is never directly a subject of International Law... But 
what is the real position of individuals in International Law, if they are not subjects thereof? 
The answer can only be that they are objects of the Law of Nations’: International Law (1905), 
344. The author has suggested elsewhere that state practice, as evidenced in the declarations of 
the judiciary and the many treaties and conventions guaranteeing human rights, reveals a 
consensus of opinion acknowledging the individual as the recipient of international rights: J 
Cassidy, ‘Emergence of the Individual as an International Juristic Entity: Enforcement of 
International Human Rights’ (2004) 9(2) Deakin Law Review 533. 
50
 See further R Higgins, ‘Role of litigation in implementing human rights’ [1999] AJHR 19; J 
Cassidy, ‘The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights: The Relationship between Customary 
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petition the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission, alleging human 
rights abuses, the Commission lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. 
The enforcement of the Commission’s decisions is left in the hands of the 
particular member state, which is often the offending entity. In this regard it 
is particularly relevant to note that the previous Liberal/National
51
 coalition 
government consistently refused to address international findings of breaches 
of human rights.
52
 This government merely rebuked the relevant committee 
for its findings against Australia and asserted that the United Nations was 
interfering in domestic affairs.
53
 Thus, despite the individual petition 
mechanism of the Human Rights Commission, the Commission has not 
proved able to provide an effective international forum for the protection of 
human rights. 
 
Moreover, international law is in itself a vulnerable source of rights. 
Customary international law can be overridden by express domestic 
legislation. While this results in Parliament being in breach of international 
law, the courts are bound to apply the infringing law. Thus in Polites v 
Commonwealth
54
 the High Court was forced to uphold conscription 
legislation that extended to resident aliens, even though this was legislation 
contrary to customary international law.
55
 Further, conventional international 
law, treaties and conventions, are not enforceable in Australia until formally 
incorporated into domestic law. For example, despite the Fraser 
                                                                                                               
International Law and Municipal Law’ (Paper presented at the Public Health and Human 
Rights Conference, Italy, 9 June 2007). 
51
 The mechanism did prove effective under the previous Keating Labor federal government. 
Thus, in response to the decision Toonen v Australia (1994) 1-3 Int Human Rts Rep 97, the 
federal Parliament passed legislation which rendered inoperative provisions of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code that criminalised consensual homosexual acts in private. In time the Criminal 
Code was amended to reflect this federal legislative change. 
52
 Charlesworth, above n 2, 64, 83. These decisions include Hagan v Australia, 4 March 1992; 
A v Australia, 30 March 1997; Winata v Australia, 18 August 2001; Rogerson v Australia, 15 
March 2002; Young v Australia, 6 August 2003; Cabal and Bertran v Australia, 19 September 
2003; Bakhtiyari v Australia, 6 November 2003; Brough v Australia, 27 April 2006; D & E v 
Australia, 25 July 2006. See further Charlesworth, above n 2, 83-91. 
53
 See, for example, then Prime Minister John Howard’s response to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination Report on the failure to apologise or offer redress to the 
stolen generations where he asserted that ‘We are not told what to do by anybody’: ABC 
Radio, ‘The Hon John Howard MP: Radio Interview with Sally Sara’, AM, 18 February 2000. 
See also then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s response to a decision of the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that ‘If a UN Committee wants to play 
domestic politics here in Australia, then it will end up with a bloody nose’: ABC Television, 
7.30 Report, 31 March 2000. See also Alexander Downer, ‘Government to Review UN Treaty 
Committees’, (Press Release, 20 March 2000). 
54
 (1945) 70 CLR 60. 
55
 Ibid 72 (Latham CJ). 
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Liberal/National coalition government ratifying the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’) 28 years ago, there has been no 
federal legislation, apart from the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and 
Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), that has comprehensively incorporated 
the Convention into domestic law.
56
  
 
 
III CONSTITUTIONAL ‘SAFEGUARDS’ OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
A Acquiring Property on Just Terms 
 
Turning to the analysis of the existing constitutional protections, section 
51(xxxi) provides for the right to have property acquired on just terms. More 
specifically, section 51(xxxi) provides that the Commonwealth has power to 
‘make laws … with respect to … [t]he acquisition of property on just terms 
from any State or person in respect of which the Parliament has power to 
make laws’.
57
 At first glance, this does not look like a constitutional human 
rights protection. It seems designed to ensure that the Commonwealth enjoys 
the legislative authority to compulsorily acquire property, including State 
property.
58
 However, section 51(xxxi) was designed to have a dual purpose.
59
 
It was also intended to provide a constraint on the compulsory acquisition 
power and ensure that whenever the Commonwealth exercises the power, it 
must do so on just terms.
60
 Thus the section was ‘intended to recognise the 
principle of the immunity of private and provincial property from 
interference by the federal authority, except on fair and equitable terms’.
61
 
However, from the outset it must be noted that section 51(xxxi) does not 
guarantee that your home cannot be compulsorily acquired. It only prevents 
                                                
56
 As McHugh notes, Australia has also failed to comply with Article 2 of the ICCPR which 
requires that individuals must have access to ‘effective and enforceable remedies’ if their 
rights are violated: above n 2. See also E Evatt, ‘Bill of Rights and International Standards’ 
(Paper presented at the Bill of Rights Conference, Sydney, 21 June 2002) 2. 
57
 Note that the requirement that the compulsory acquisition relate to a matter ‘in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws’ requires that a law passed under s 51(xxxi) 
must also be supported by another legislative head of power: PJ Magennis Pty Ltd v The 
Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382, 402-3 (Latham CJ). 
58
 See Dixon J in Grace Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290-1. 
59
 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349-50. 
60
 Johnson Fear & Kingham v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 314, 318; Bank of New South 
Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349-50. 
61
 Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901), 
641. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                   
VOLUME 13 NO 2 
144
the power being exercised arbitrarily.
62
 It merely provides that the 
compulsory acquisition must be on just terms; it must be fair,
63
 balancing the 
community’s interests against the interests of the person whose property is to 
be taken.
64
  
 
There are a number of flaws in section 51(xxxi) as a source of constitutional 
protection, flaws that should be addressed through reform. First, section 
51(xxxi) applies only to the Commonwealth. There is no equivalent provision 
in the State Constitutions. Section 51(xxxi) does not apply to a compulsory 
acquisition by a State
65
 unless the federal government has funded the 
compulsory acquisition.
66
 It is also unclear whether section 51(xxxi) applies 
to the Territories, in particular the federal government’s use of section 122 of 
the Constitution (the ‘Territories’ power).
67
 As with the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,
68
 the terms of any bill of rights instrument should 
extend to the State and Territory governments, not just the federal 
government.  
 
Second, there is merit in including a provision similar to that found in section 
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 that ensures that any 
expropriation of property must be under a law of general application. This 
would prevent the property rights of marginalised members of the community 
being targeted by the government through private Acts of Parliament. 
Historically, examples of such governmental actions can be found in the 
                                                
62
 Grace Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (19946) 72 CLR 269, 290-1 (Dixon J). 
63
 Nelungaloo v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 495, 569. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Pye v Renshaw (1951) 84 CLR 58, 79-80. See also Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v The State of 
New South Wales (2000) 205 CLR 399, 409-10 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 
425 (Kirby J), 433 (Callinan J). 
66
 Such funding could be through, for example, a s 96 grant to the State: Pye v Renshaw (1951) 
84 CLR 58, 83. 
67
 While in Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 CLR 564 the High Court unanimously held 
that the power under s 122 was absolute and s 51(xxxi) did not restrict the Commonwealth’s 
power to acquire property in the Territories, this was later doubted in Newcrest Mining (WA) 
Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 190 CLR 513, 567, 569 (Gaudron J), 603, 614 (Gummow J), 652, 
661-2 (Kirby J). This issue is, however, now effectively moot as the self-government 
legislation (Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 and Australian Capital Territory 
(Self-Government) Act 1988) effectively overrules Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) 119 
CLR 564. 
68
 Note that, strangely, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) do not include an actual ‘property’ protection clause. 
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dissolution of the Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses
69
 and the 
dissolution of the Builders Labourers Federation in 1986.
70
 
 
Third, and most importantly, any protection should extend to compulsory 
acquisitions as a matter of substance, not just form. There are a number of 
existing limitations to the operation of section 51(xxxi) which mean it will 
not always apply to what is in substance a compulsory acquisition. Section 
51(xxxi) applies only if there is a compulsory acquisition.
71
 It does not apply 
if the Commonwealth negotiates an agreement for the acquisition.
72
 For 
section 51(xxxi) to apply, the Commonwealth must acquire a proprietary 
interest in the subject property, not merely constrain its use.
73
 Similarly, the 
courts have asserted that section 51(xxxi) applies only to a law that results in 
an acquisition of property, as opposed to one that merely diminishes the 
content of a property right.
74
 Section 51(xxxi) has also been held to be 
inapplicable to laws that make a ‘genuine adjustment of competing claims, 
rights and obligations in the common interests between parties who stand in a 
particular relationship’.
75
 Moreover, the courts have asserted that statutory 
rights can be acquired without compliance with section 51(xxxi). Effectively 
the courts have said that if a proprietary right was created by statute, then it 
can be reduced by statute.
76
 These limitations have wrongly allowed form to 
prevail over what is in substance a compulsory acquisition. 
                                                
69 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116.  
70
 Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration - Consequential Provisions) 
Act 1986 (Cth). See further L Ross, Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win! : Builders Labourers fight 
Deregistration 1981-94 (2004). 
71
 Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 543, 573. 
72
 John Cooke & Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1924) 34 CLR 269, 282; Trade Practices 
Commission v Tooth & Co Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397, 417. 
73
 Thus in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 145, 181, 246-8, members of the 
High Court held that s 51(xxxi) did not apply to the subject law that prevented the State of 
Tasmania using certain (world heritage listed) lands without the Commonwealth’s consent, as 
there was no vesting of a proprietary interest in the land in the Commonwealth. 
74
 Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, 528 
(Dawson and Toohey JJ); Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 
155, 185 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); Commonwealth v WMC Resources Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 1, 
70-1. 
75
 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226, 236. See also Airservices 
Australia v Canadian Airlines (1999) 202 CLR 133. Note, however, Gummow and Callinan 
JJ’s criticism of this principle: Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines (1999) 202 CLR 133, 
299, 312. Thus a law reducing Medicare benefits was said not to be subject to s 51(xxxi): 
Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226, 236. 
76
 Health Insurance Commission v Peverill (1994) 179 CLR 226, 237 (Mason CJ, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ); Georgiadis v AOTC (1994) 179 CLR 297, 305-6 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron 
JJ). This reasoning has been used to exclude from the operation of s 51(xxxi) legislation that 
has diminished intellectual property rights (Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd 
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Fourth, the question of the absoluteness of the protection then needs to be 
addressed. Under the current law in Australia, while generally the legislative 
powers specified in, inter alia, section 51 of the Constitution, are said to be 
subject to section 51(xxxi),
77
 the High Court has held that in certain cases 
legislative powers
78
 may be used to compulsorily acquire property other than 
on just terms. Is it appropriate for the courts to conclude that it is express or 
implied in a section of the Constitution that legislative powers are not subject 
to section 51(xxxi)? 
 
Should there be an absolute freedom from compulsory acquisition? The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States’ Bill of Rights provides a right not to be 
deprived of property without due process of law. As Dixon J noted in Grace 
Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth
79
 this provision appropriately has as its 
primary purpose the protection of the citizen, rather than extending an 
acquisition power to the government.  
 
Could the absoluteness of the protection be abridged in times of national 
emergency?
80
 Section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 allows certain rights to be abridged in the case of a state of emergency. 
The Table of non-derogable rights included in section 37(5) does not include 
the protection of property rights under section 25, but rather is confined to 
rights such as the right to equality, right to human dignity and right to life. 
Further, section 25(2) allows for the expropriation of property for a ‘public 
purpose or in the public interest’. However, the expropriation must not be 
                                                                                                               
(1994) 181 CLR 134), petroleum exploration rights (Commonwealth v WMC Resources Ltd 
(1998) 194 CLR 1, 38, 51) and Medicare benefits (Health Insurance Commission v Peverill 
(1994) 179 CLR 226, 237). 
77
 Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 372; Commonwealth v Tasmania 
(1983) 158 CLR 1, 145 (Mason J) (‘Tasmanian Dam case’). 
78
 For example, s 51(i) (‘trade and commerce’ power: Airservices Australia v Canadian 
Airlines (1999) 202 CLR 133, 180-1, 251, 304-5); s 51(ii) (‘taxation’ power: MacCormick v 
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 158 CLR 622; Australian Tape Manufacturers 
Association v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, 508-10 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ)); s 51(vi) (‘defence’ power: Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 
361), s 51(xvii) (‘bankruptcy and insolvency’ power: Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 
105 CLR 361); and s 51(xviii) (‘intellectual property’ power: Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics 
Systems Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 134, 160-1 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ)). 
79
 (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290-1. 
80
 Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 11(3)(b) allows the freedom from forced 
labour to be breached in times of national emergency. However, the national emergency 
qualification does not provide a basis for abridging the right not to be deprived of property 
under section 20 of the Charter. 
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arbitrary, it must be effected through a general law, and just compensation 
must be paid. 
 
Alternatively, the right not to be deprived of property could be subject to a 
general limitation that it may be subject to reasonable laws. Section 20 of 
Victoria’s Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006, for example, provides 
a right not to be deprived of property ‘other than in accordance with law’. 
Moreover, all provisions of the Charter are subject to reasonable limits under 
law: section 7(2). Similarly, under section 36(1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 all protections, including the protection of 
property rights under section 25, may be circumscribed by general legislation 
where the ‘limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society …’ 
 
Alternatively, the focus could shift from a right not to be deprived of 
property, to a guarantee that the terms of any acquisition will be just, and that 
any consequent compensation will be fair.
81
 Sections 25(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provide in detail for a right 
to compensation for an expropriation of property. This includes a statement 
that the ‘amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public 
interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all the 
circumstances …’. Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 then details factors relevant to the determination of a just 
payment, such as current use of the land, its market value, the extent of any 
state investment/subsidy and the purpose of the expropriation. The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides extremely useful 
guidelines for an Australian protection against the deprivation of property. 
 
B Trial by Jury 
 
The right to trial by jury is supposedly protected by section 80 of the 
Constitution. The section provides in part that: ‘The trial
82
 on indictment of 
any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury.’ It will 
be seen that section 80 is subject to a number of major limitations that render 
it ineffective as a human rights protection.  
 
                                                
81
 Note that the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 20 does not include a ‘just 
compensation’ clause. 
82
 As s 80 is confined to the process of ‘trial’ and thus has no application to sentencing: 
Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1, 24. 
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The right to trial by our peers is part of the broader notion that individuals 
should not be subject to arbitrary detention.
83
 The right to a jury trial is one of 
the pillars of our criminal justice system that sets our society apart from 
police states. Thus as Deane J declared in Kingswell v R:
 84
 
 
The guarantee of s 80 of the Constitution was not the mere expression of 
some casual preference for one form of criminal trial. It reflected a deep-
seated conviction of free men and women about the way in which justice 
should be administered in criminal cases. That conviction finds a solid basis 
in an understanding of the history and functioning of the common law as a 
bulwark against the tyranny of arbitrary punishment. 
 
Given the importance of trial by jury, these shortcomings in its protection 
should be addressed through reform. First, as with section 51(xxxi), section 
80 is limited by its express terms so as to apply only to Commonwealth 
laws.
85
 There is no equivalent provision in the State constitutions
86
 and the 
applicability of section 80 to the Territories is uncertain.
87
 Nevertheless, it 
would be desirable to extend any right to a jury trial to those charged under 
State and Territory law, not just those charged under federal law.  
 
Second, and most importantly, section 80 has been interpreted as a 
meaningless tautology and needs to be rephrased so that it provides effective 
protection. Narrowly construed, section 80 states that ‘trial by jury shall be 
by jury’. The reason for this tautology lies in the fact that the technical 
meaning of an indictable offence is one that is tried by judge and jury, while 
a summary offence is tried by judge alone. This tautology has allowed the 
Australian judiciary to conclude that section 80 requires that, if the subject 
offence is an indictable offence, there must be a jury trial, but that it does not 
compel the Commonwealth to ensure that serious offences are classified as 
indictable offences.
88
 As long as the Commonwealth chooses to make a crime 
a summary offence, no matter how serious the offence nor how severe the 
                                                
83
 Kingswell v R (1985) 159 CLR 264, 298 (Deane J). 
84
 (1985) 159 CLR 264, 298. 
85
 Byrnes v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 1, 32 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ), 
39 (Kirby J). 
86
 Note that the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) does not include a right to a 
jury trial, merely to a fair and public hearing: s 24(1). Similarly, s 35(3) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996 only provides a right to a ‘fair trial’. 
87
 In R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629, 635 the courts asserted the phrase ‘laws of the 
Commonwealth’ - that implicitly excludes the laws of the territories. In Kruger v 
Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, the court was divided on the matter. 
88
 R v Archdall and Roskruge; ex parte Carrigan and Brown (1928) 41 CLR 128, 136, 139-40.  
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consequent punishment,
89
 there is no right to a jury trial.
90
 Thus the reference 
to an indictable offence in section 80 needs to be replaced by a criterion that 
is tied to the seriousness of the offence. For example, section 11(f) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides a right to a jury trial 
where the ‘maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five 
years or a more severe punishment’. Under section 24(e) of the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZ) the minimum period of imprisonment triggering the right to a 
jury trial is only three months. Setting a period of imprisonment as the 
keystone for the application of the protection is preferable to the use of the 
technical summary/indictable distinction in section 80. It is also preferable to 
any suggestion that the protection apply in ‘serious criminal cases’.
91
 The 
notion of ‘serious’ is too vague to provide the basis of such an important 
right.  
 
Third, it needs to be considered whether the right to a jury trial should extend 
to courts martial. In accordance with the principle that it is for the 
Commonwealth to determine whether an offence is to be tried by jury, 
section 80 has been held not to extend to courts martial.
92
 It is interesting that 
the right to a jury trial is often excluded from military tribunals, through the 
operation, for example, of sections 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and 24(e) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). 
 
Related to this question is the issue of whether a right to a jury trial should 
also be applicable to civil cases. The United States’ Bill of Rights recognises 
the right to a jury in both criminal and civil cases. Specifically, the Sixth 
Amendment provides for the right to a fair,
93
 speedy, impartial, public trial by 
jury in criminal cases. A right to a jury trial is also recognised for civil cases 
                                                
89
 Even though the subject offence, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 30K, carried a penalty of one year 
imprisonment, the legislation stated that it could be tried summarily. 
90
 R v Archdall and Roskruge; ex parte Carrigan and Brown (1928) 41 CLR 128, 136, 139-40. 
See further R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556; Spratt 
v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 (Barwick CJ); Zarb v Kennedy (1968) 121 CLR 283, 294 
(Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ); Li Chia Hsing v Rankin (1979) 141 
CLR 182, 202; Kingswell v R (1985) 159 CLR 264; Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 
CLR 386, 396, 436-9; Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248. 
91
 As suggested by the minority justices who have sought to give s 80 some meaning. See 
Deane J in Kingswell v R (1985) 159 CLR 264, 310, 318; Murphy J in Li Chia Hsing v Rankin 
(1979) 141 CLR 182, 202; Kirby J in Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1, 38-9. 
92
 In Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18 a majority of the court (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ dissenting) asserted that the conferral 
of power on a tribunal to try and punish members of the defence forces breached the separation 
of judicial powers under Ch III of the Constitution. See also Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 
166 CLR 518, 541, 545, 573-4. 
93
 This includes a right to legal representation.  
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by the Seventh Amendment. However, as the right to personal liberty is 
clearly more important than property rights, there may be a case for limiting 
the right to a jury trial to criminal matters. 
 
C Freedom of Religion 
 
Section 116 Constitution provides: 
 
The commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or 
for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of 
any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any 
office or public trust under the Commonwealth. 
 
Section 116 prohibits four distinct aspects of governmental involvement in 
religious matters: 
 
• the establishment of any religion; 
• the imposition of any religious observance; 
• the prohibition of the free exercise of any religion; and 
• the use of religion as a qualification for public office 
 
While section 116 has four heads, nearly all the key cases
94
 have been 
concerned only with the third clause, the protection of the free exercise of 
any religion. As detailed below, section 116 is subject to major important 
limitations that, despite its seeming breadth, have rendered this so-called 
constitutional guarantee a ‘paper tiger’. The paucity of protection afforded by 
section 116 is remarkable given that the freedom of conscience and religion 
is one of the most fundamental human rights. It is recognised in leading 
international instruments, such as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), and domestic bill of rights instruments, discussed 
below. 
 
How then should the absence of the protection of religious beliefs be 
addressed? First, again any reform measures need to extend to the States and 
Territories, not just the federal government. Whilst section 116 is 
                                                
94
 That is, apart from Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 
559 which concerned the prohibition of establishing a religion. A 6:1 majority of the High 
Court held that, while s 116 prevented the Commonwealth from establishing a particular 
religion as the official/national religion, s 116 did not prevent the government from providing 
financial aid to non-government schools, including church schools. This case is known as the 
‘DOGS case’ because a body called Defence of Government Schools initiated the challenge. 
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incorporated in Chapter V of the Constitution, under the heading ‘The 
States’,
95
 the section is expressly confined to Commonwealth laws, to the 
exclusion of State laws.
96
 Thus, apart from the Tasmanian Parliament, which 
is constrained by provisions in its own Constitution,
97
 State parliaments are 
not prevented from carrying out any of the listed acts on the basis of religion. 
Again, the application of section 116 to the Territories is uncertain.
98
 The 
protection of freedom of religion should, by contrast, be comprehensive in 
the Australian jurisdictions. 
 
Second, section 116 should protect Australians from legislation that both 
directly and incidentally infringes their freedom of religion. Under the current 
law, section 116 applies only if the express and single purpose of the 
legislation offends section 116.
99
 This point has been made in the context of 
both the first
100
 and third
101
 limbs of section 116. A law is no less abhorrent if 
it achieves its goal of hampering the free exercise of religion whilst also 
achieving some other objective.  
 
                                                
95
 J La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (1972) 228-9. 
96
 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 577, 594, 652. 
97
 Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) s 34 guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion. 
98
 In obiter in Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132, 143 Dixon CJ (with whom Webb, Kitto 
and Taylor JJ agreed) suggested that s 116 applies to a law enacted under the territories power, 
and this view was adopted by Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Kruger v Commonwealth 
(1997) 190 CLR 1, 79, 85, 92-3, 96, 114-125, 141, 162, 166-7. A contrary view was adopted 
by Brennan CJ and Dawson J: (1997) 190 CLR 1, 41-6, 53, 68-70, 73. 
99
 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 579, 615-616, 
653; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 41, 85-6, 131-132; Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 71 ALR 578, 591. 
100
 Thus in Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth a series of Acts which 
extended to the States financial assistance, subject to conditions including that a proportion of 
the funds must be given to non-government schools, were held not to have breached s 116 as 
the legislation did not have the ‘purpose and effect of setting up any religion as a state church’: 
(1981) 146 CLR 559, 604 (Gibbs J). See also Mason J in Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black 
v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 612 and 616; (1981) 146 CLR 559, 610 (Stephen J). 
Rather the objective of the subject law was to assist secular private schools, as well as church 
schools, and thus the subject grants could be seen as essentially for educational purposes. 
101
 In Kruger v Commonwealth a majority of the High Court held that the Aboriginal 
Ordinance 1918 (Cth) that authorised the removal of Aboriginal children from their families 
was not invalid as a law must have the purpose of offending s 116 before the law would be 
invalidated: (1997) 190 CLR 1, 41, 53 and 131-2. While the effect of the Ordinance had been 
to impair, or even prohibit, the spiritual beliefs and practices of Aboriginal persons, that was 
not its purpose and thus the Ordinance was not invalidated by s 116: (1997) 190 CLR 1, 85-6 
(Toohey J); (1997) 190 CLR 1, 161 (Gummow J). See also Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 71 ALR 578, 591. 
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Third, the High Court’s
102
 distinction in Krygger v Williams
103
 between laws 
(i) prohibiting the doing of acts required by religion (which are prohibited) 
and (ii) requiring the doing of acts prohibited by religion (which are not 
prohibited) must be rejected. Under this view only positive acts required by a 
religion are protected and, it will be seen, then only if they are not contrary to 
the general community's interest. A religion-based pacifism
104
 is 
consequently not protected. A prohibition against blood transfusions and a 
religious requirement to respect the Sabbath by, inter alia, not working on 
that day, provide further examples of religious requirements that are not 
protected. Taken to its extremes, the above distinction gives rise to absurd 
consequences. For example, a religion requiring human sacrifice would 
seemingly be protected by section 116 as human sacrifice is an act required 
by the religion.
105
 For reasons such as this, the United States’ courts, with 
respect to their equivalent provision, have long rejected this distinction.  
 
Thus reform measures need to embrace language that makes it clear that the 
protection extends, not just to positive acts of worship, but also to the 
abstaining from certain acts. Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides for the ‘freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’ and states that this includes the freedom of a person 
to ‘manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching’. Article 18(2) specifically provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subject to 
coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice’. Thus the protection of ‘observance’ and the prohibition 
on coercing a person to act in a way contrary to religious beliefs could 
address these concerns. Such general protections might also be 
complemented by specific clauses. For example, while section 15 of the Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) similarly protects the right to ‘manifest’ a person’s 
religion in ‘worship, observance, practice or teaching’, section 11 includes a 
right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment. The latter is of course 
relevant to the refusal to undergo a blood transfusion or other medical 
procedure on religious grounds. 
 
                                                
102 Constituted by only two members of the High Court, Griffith CJ and Barton J. 
103
 (1912) 15 CLR 366. 
104
 That underpinned the factual basis of both Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 and 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. In regard to 
the Buddhist faith and pacifism see ‘Buddhism and war’: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
religion/religions/buddhism/buddhistethics/war.shtml.  
105
 Note, however, that the qualification to s 116 that provides that the right to freedom of 
religion can be constrained when the public interest so requires will prevent this example 
actually being protected under s 116. 
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The fourth, and most difficult, issue that needs to be addressed in such 
reforms is the degree of absoluteness of the protection. The protection 
afforded by section 116 is far from absolute and can be overridden by, inter 
alia,
106
 the public interest.
107
 Thus, in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses v Commonwealth, the High Court unanimously held that activities 
which a religion requires but which the community ‘in general’ regards as 
‘unsocial’
108
 or ‘subversive …[or] dangerous to the common weal’
109
 might 
validly be prohibited.
110
 For this reason, section 116 has proven ineffective in 
preventing the mistreatment of non-Anglo-Irish religious groups, such as the 
Muslim community,
111
 where the general interests of the Australian 
community have overridden the Muslim community’s religious and 
community interests. Relevantly, all but one banned organisation under the 
Commonwealth anti-terrorism laws
112
 are Islamic. In light of the related 
offence of supporting such banned associations, these laws obviously impact 
on the Muslim community.
 
 
 
The United States Bill of Rights provides an example of an absolute freedom 
of religion. The First Amendment provides that ‘congress shall make no law 
respecting any establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof …’. Logic dictates, however, that there must be some limits to the 
free exercise of religion. Human rights are rarely absolute. Using the example 
mentioned earlier in this article, a religious conviction involving human 
                                                
106
 It can also be avoided through s 96 grants: Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v 
Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 593. Section 96 allows the Commonwealth to make 
grants to the States. A practice of attaching conditions to such monies is now well established. 
Thus monies could be provided to a State on the condition that it is used for roads or, as in this 
case, for funding private schools. 
107
 Thus in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v Commonwealth the National Security 
(Subversive Association) Regulations that required the outright dissolution of this religious 
group were held to be valid, the court finding that s 116 did not entitle the Jehovah's Witnesses 
to advocate doctrines prejudicial to the war: (1943) 67 CLR 116, 155 (Starke J); 159 (Williams 
J); 149 (Rich J). 
108
 Ibid 155 (Starke J). 
109
 Ibid 149-50 (Rich J). 
110
 See also ibid 159 (Williams J). 
111 Australian Muslim communities, for example, have suffered considerable discrimination 
generally, but particularly since the introduction of the above anti-terrorism laws. See the 
Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network fact sheets: ‘New anti-terror laws and the 
Muslim community - a plain English explanation’ http://www.communitylaw.org.au/cb_pages/ 
anti_terrorism_laws.php; HREOC, above n 25.  
112
 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Part II includes offences in regard to unlawful associations. 
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sacrifice cannot be protected. Similarly, a religious conviction that involves 
the abuse or degradation of animals or humans
113
 cannot be protected.  
In recognition of the need for some legitimate limitations, even the United 
States Supreme Court has adopted a ‘balancing’ approach to its religious 
guarantees that will at times allow the public interest to override a specific 
group’s religious beliefs.
114
 Nevertheless the Australian High Court’s 
suggestion that general community interests can prevail over minority rights 
is disturbing. Consider the rationale for introducing section 116 into the 
Constitution. Surely it was designed to protect those who otherwise lack the 
political or numerical influence to protect their rights. Yet it is the beliefs of 
this very group that Starke and Rich JJ
115
 in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses v Commonwealth suggest should be overridden by the majority. 
Whilst there will be occasions where inconsistent rights will have to be 
balanced,
116
 the statement of Starke and Rich JJ accords too little importance 
to the protection of individual rights and does not sit comfortably with the 
imperative opening words of section 116, ‘The Commonwealth shall not ...’  
 
Thus a narrower application of the balancing test needs to be identified. What 
limits could acceptably be placed on the free exercise of religion? Latham CJ 
makes a valid point in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v 
Commonwealth
117
 that for a person to be able to exercise religion freely, the 
State in which that freedom can be exercised must continue to exist.
118
 Hence 
it is ‘consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to 
restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the 
maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued existence of 
the community’.
119
 Thus, the continued existence of the State must 
necessarily prevail over the free exercise of religion. This point is particularly 
pertinent in the so-called ‘Age of Terror’. However, extreme care is needed 
to ensure that underlying fears about terrorist attacks do not lead to 
discrimination against innocent persons.  
                                                
113
 Care needs to be taken in regard to claims of degradation. For example, protocols that could 
appear degradatory to women might be based on historical/cultural protectionary norms. 
114
 See further the discussion of the United States’ approach in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
115
 (1943) 67 CLR 116, 155 (Starke J); 149-50 (Rich J). 
116
 A narrow scope for the overriding of religious freedoms was suggested by Mason ACJ and 
Brennan J in Church of New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120. 
They commented that the ‘freedom to act in accordance with one's religious beliefs is not as 
inviolate as the freedom to believe ...’, adding that such actions cannot be accorded immunity 
where they offend non-discriminatory laws. 
117
 (1943) 67 CLR 116, 131-2 (with whom McTiernan J agreed). 
118
 Ibid. 
119
 Ibid. 
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The Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 recognises the 
right to enjoy cultural practices, to exercise a religion and to speak a 
language: section 19. However, the rights stated in the Charter are subject to 
a general limitation: they may be subject to reasonable limits under the law 
having regard to all relevant factors: section 7(2). Similarly, section 2 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognises as a ‘Fundamental 
freedom … freedom of conscience and religion’ but also provides in section 
1 that the freedom is subject ‘to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.
120
 Section 
36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 contains a 
similar provision, but also states in section 31(2) that the right to, inter alia, 
practise religion ‘may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights’. Article 18(3) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights is a little more specific, only allowing 
legislative limitation of the freedom of religion to ‘protect public safety, 
order, health, or moral or fundamental rights and freedoms of others’. Thus 
these human rights instruments provide useful guidance as to how to balance 
the private right to exercise religion with the private rights of other citizens 
and the maintenance of the broader society. 
 
D Freedom from Interstate Discrimination 
 
Section 117 of the Constitution provides: 
 
A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any 
other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally 
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other 
State. 
 
Broadly speaking, the impact of section 117 is that one State may not impose 
on the residents of another State some disability that is not imposed equally 
on residents of the first State. Section 117 continues to be a potentially 
important provision in contemporary Australia as it endeavours to achieve the 
equal treatment of the residents of different States. As Mason CJ stated in 
Street v Queensland Bar Association,
121
 ‘[t]his section is one of the 
comparatively few provisions in the Constitution which was designed to 
enhance national unity and a real sense of national identity by eliminating 
disability or discrimination on account of residence in another State’. In a 
                                                
120
 Note that section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) contains the same ‘reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’ test.  
121
 (1989) 168 CLR 461, 485; see also 583-4 (McHugh J). 
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modern federation such as Australia the equal treatment of citizens continues 
to be an important human right. 
 
Yet, despite the grand sentiments underlying section 117, it has proven to be 
largely ineffective in protecting even the right to equality, let alone the 
freedom of movement. Section 117’s failure stems from two sources. First, 
the section has racist foundations, despite being inspired by Article IV of the 
United States Constitution of 1789.
122
 Article IV provides: ‘The citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States.’
123
 During the drafting of section 117 the use of the United 
States’ concepts of ‘due process’ and ‘equal protection’, which have provided 
great sources of judge-made constitutional law in the United States, were 
defeated because it was believed that they would invalidate laws based 
explicitly on racial discrimination.
124
 The concern was that laws which today 
would universally be regarded as abhorrent due to their discrimination 
against Aboriginal, Islander and Asians persons, but which were at the time 
regarded by government entities as essential, might be invalidated by the 
clause.
125
 For example, the State of Western Australia was adamant about the 
need to exclude Asian persons from its goldfields and would not support a 
clause that prevented it passing racially based laws.
126
 How different the 
history of civil liberties in Australia might have been had the United States’ 
concepts made it into the final text of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
 
Second, the courts’ approach in many section 117 cases has clearly been too 
technical. The leading cases on section 117 suggest once again that the courts 
have rendered a constitutional guarantee a matter of semantics that can be 
easily circumvented by clever legislatures. It will be seen that section 117 is 
subject to six possible limitations that should be addressed through reform. 
 
                                                
122
 See Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 485 (Mason CJ).  
123
 See La Nauze, above n 95, 68. Note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982) contains two clauses that are relevant to the application of s 117. Section 6 specifies 
certain mobility rights. Section 6(2)(b) extends to every permanent resident of Canada the right 
‘to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province’. This protection is subject to ‘any laws 
or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate 
among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence’: s 6(3)(a). 
The right is also subject to ‘any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a 
qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services’: s 6(3)(b). Under s 15(1) there 
is also a general right to equality under the law, without discrimination. 
124
 See H Charlesworth, ‘Individual Rights and the Australian High Court’ (1986) Law in 
Context 53, 113. 
125
 See ibid. 
126
 See also the discussion of Lee Fay v Vincent (1908) 7 CLR 389, below. 
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First, in contrast to the constitutional provisions discussed above, there is no 
case authority suggesting that section 117 applies to the Commonwealth. 
Section 117 is clearly aimed primarily at the States.
127
 Like section 116, 
section 117 is contained in Chapter V of the Constitution, entitled ‘The 
States’. In the case of section 117, however, its constitutional location 
actually reflects its application. While the Commonwealth is prevented from 
discriminating between the States in some respects by sections other than 
section 117, notably sections 51(ii), 92 and 99 of the Constitution, the 
prohibition in section 117 does not include the Commonwealth. This 
deficiency needs to be addressed. 
 
Second, section 117 applies only if residence is the sole basis of the 
discrimination.
128
 Thus, if the discrimination is on the basis of residence and 
domicile,
129
 even though these often coincide, section 117 will not apply 
because it is legally possible that a person could be resident in Western 
Australia, but domiciled elsewhere.
130
 Such reasoning is clearly absurdly 
technical, particularly given that the two prongs of the double-barrelled 
criterion of discrimination, namely, residence and domicile, are so closely 
related. A preferable approach can be found in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. The mobility rights protected under section 6(2) are 
subject to ‘any laws or practices of general application in force in a province 
other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of 
province of present or previous residence’: section 6(3)(a). This clause would 
require the court to determine whether residency was the primary basis for 
discrimination.  
 
Third, section 117 applies only if the person being discriminated against is 
resident in a State other than the legislating State. It does not apply if that 
person is a resident in the legislating State. Thus in Lee Fay v Vincent
131
 the 
High Court held that section 117 did not apply as the ‘section only applies to 
a person who, being resident in one State, is seeking to assert rights in 
another. In the present case the person in respect of whom the rights are 
asserted is a resident in Western Australia, not in another State, and the rights 
are asserted in Western Australia.’
132
 Section 117 should simply be 
concerned with discrimination on the basis of residence per se. It should not 
                                                
127
 See Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 485 (Mason CJ). 
128
 Davies and Jones v Western Australia (1904) 2 CLR 29, 39 (Griffith CJ), 47 and 49 (Barton 
J), 53 (O’Connor J). 
129
 As in Davies and Jones v Western Australia (1904) 2 CLR 29. 
130
 Ibid 39 (Griffith CJ), 47 and 49 (Barton J), 53 (O’Connor J). 
131
 (1908) 7 CLR 389. 
132
 Ibid (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ). 
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matter whether a State or Territory is effectively discriminating in favour of 
or against its own residents.  
Fourth, in Lee Fay v Vincent
133
 the High Court also held that section 117 only 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of current residency.
134
 Section 117 is 
impotent to prevent discrimination by one State on the basis of previous 
residence in another State. Again the Canadian Charter provides a useful 
reform model that could perhaps be augmented to ensure that the dominance 
of substance over form is assured. The mobility rights recognised under 
section 6(2) of the Charter are protected from ‘any laws or practices … that 
discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or 
previous residence’: section 6(3)(a).  
 
Fifth, since only a ‘subject of the Queen’ can invoke section 117, its 
protection might not extend to persons who are not Australian citizens.
135
 
Brennan J also suggested in Street v Queensland Bar Association that it 
might protect only natural persons and thus might not extend to artificial 
persons, for example companies.
136
 
 
Sixth, section 117 is not absolute. The courts have recently asserted that 
section 117 does not apply to laws that discriminate on the basis of residence 
in a way that is ‘appropriate and adapted (sometimes described as 
“proportional”) to the attainment of a proper objective’.
137
 The difficult 
question once again is to determine the absoluteness of the protection(s). 
Should it be absolute, as under the United States’ Constitution, or subject to 
some limitation? The right to freedom of movement
138
 and right to reside 
throughout the relevant state
139
 are recognised in a number of bills of rights. 
However, commonly these rights are stated to be subject ‘to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’.
140
 What limits could be justified? Can discrimination on 
                                                
133
 Ibid. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 525 (Deane J), 541 (Dawson J), 
554 (Toohey J). 
136
 Ibid 505 (Brennan J); Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission (2006) 226 CLR 362, 
408 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
137
 Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission (2006) 226 CLR 362, 409-10 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
138
 In, for example, Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 12; Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZ) s 18; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 21(1). 
139
 In, for example, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s 6(2); Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZ) s 18; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 21(3). 
140
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s 6(2). Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 5; 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 36(1) contains a similar provision. 
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the basis of residency ever be justified? Can a State legitimately restrict to its 
own residents the right of franchise for electing its legislature?
141
 Is a resident 
of one State entitled to welfare benefits that another State provides 
exclusively to its residents?
142
 Section 6(3)(b) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms recognises the legitimacy of laws that provide for 
‘reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of 
publicly provided social services’. Can a State encourage local industry by 
adding a figure of, for example, 10% to the cost of out-of-State tenders for 
government contracts? In many cases, a State will be able to pursue a policy 
of protecting the legitimate interests of the State without using residence as 
the operative factor. For example, there would obviously be no constitutional 
objection to Queensland conditioning its bail laws, not on residence within 
the State, but on the likelihood of the accused fleeing the jurisdiction.
143
 
Similarly, competence to practise law might be tested in ways other than 
insisting on a period of residence.
144
 In other cases, however, such as 
franchise in State elections and perhaps the provision of benefits or services 
paid for through State taxes, the criterion of residence may be defended as a 
reasonable requirement.  
 
Perhaps, as Mason CJ suggests,
145
 each of these difficult cases needs to be 
tested by asking whether the discrimination would ‘detract from the concept 
of Australian nationhood or national unity which is the object of the section 
to ensure’. Alternatively, McHugh J asserts that the ‘question is not whether a 
particular subject-matter serves the object of section 117; it is whether, by 
necessary implication, the matter is so exclusively the concern of the State 
and its people that an interstate resident is not entitled to equality of treatment 
in respect of it’.
146
 Perhaps it is necessary to include in any bill of rights 
instrument some specific guidance as to the balance between State autonomy 
and discrimination on the basis of residence. 
 
 
IV IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
                                                
141
 See further Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 491, 513, 528, 548, 
560, 570 and 584. 
142
 Baldwin v Montana Fish and Game Commission 436 US 371 (1978), 383. See Street v 
Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 491-2 (Mason CJ).  
143
 See Re Loubie [1986] 1 Qd R 272.  
144
 See also Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 493 (Mason CJ).  
145
 Ibid 492 (Mason CJ).  
146
 Ibid 584.  
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Before concluding this discussion of the paucity of existing constitutional 
protections, it would be remiss not to consider whether the framework of the 
Constitution may provide implied rights that serve as a further source of 
constitutional protection.
147
 
 
The process of recognising implied constitutional protections began with 
Murphy J in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Murphy J believed that certain 
implied rights were ‘part of the fabric of the Constitution’,
148
 namely: 
 
• the implied freedom of movement, speech and other 
communication;
149
 
• the implied freedom from slavery;
150
 and 
• the implied freedom from arbitrary discrimination on the basis of 
sex.
151
 
 
It was not until the 1990s, however, that the notion of implied constitutional 
protections was adopted by a majority of High Court justices. In more recent 
times certain members of the Australian High Court have suggested that a 
number of implied guarantees can be extrapolated from the nature and 
scheme of the Constitution. Some of these implied guarantees include: 
 
• the right to procedural fairness;
152
  
                                                
147
 See further McHugh, above n 2. 
148
 Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556, 581. Note that Dawson J 
subsequently criticised Murphy J’s suggestion that such protections are impliedly protected by 
the Constitution: Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 186. 
See McHugh, ibid. 
149
 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, 88; 
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, 137; McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith (1979) 144 
CLR 633, 670; Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR 266, 312; Miller v TCN 
Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556, 581-2. 
150
 R v Director-General of Social Welfare (Vic); Ex parte Henry (1975) 133 CLR 369, 388. 
151
 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237, 267. 
152
 Implied from Chap II Constitution: Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 
CLR 1, 27 and 29 (Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ); Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 
CLR 518, 580 (Deane J); Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1993) 181 CLR 18, 34 (Deane J); 
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 and 614-5 (Deane J), 684-5 and 689 
(Toohey J), 703-4 (Gaudron J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, 
Dawson and McHugh JJ), 486-7 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 502-3 (Gaudron J). Note that the 
minority justices in Leeth recognised a broader right to equality: 485 and 487-8 (Deane and 
Toohey JJ), 502-3 (Gaudron J). Section 4(1) Commonwealth Prisoners Act 1967 (Cth) directed 
a court when determining a non-parole period to be guided by the law of the State or Territory 
in which the Commonwealth offender was convicted. These laws varied considerably from 
State to State. It was argued that s 4(1) was invalid as it authorised the unequal treatment of 
offenders depending on the State/Territory in which they were convicted. Deane, Toohey and 
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• the right to vote;
153
  
• the right to proper administration of the judicial power;
154
 and 
• the implied freedom of political communication.
155
 
 
As with the express constitutional guarantees, however, and exemplified in 
the context of the implied freedom of political communication, the Australian 
High Court has been particularly mindful of the need to interpret implied 
protections narrowly. Members of the High Court have asserted that the 
implied freedom of political communication: 
 
• is to be narrowly construed and is confined to what is necessary to 
give effect to the terms and structure of the Constitution, rather than 
what is necessary to give effect to representative and responsible 
government;
156
 
                                                                                                               
Gaudron JJ agreed, asserting that the legislation breached a right to equality that was implicit 
in Ch III Constitution: 487 (Deane and Toohey JJ); 502-3 (Gaudron J). Note that Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Dawson and McHugh JJ held that the law did not breach any constitutional 
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Bill of Rights?’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166; G Winterton, ‘Separation of Judicial 
Power as an Implied Bill of Rights’ in G Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian 
Constitutional Law (1994), 185; F Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and 
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Review 248; F Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ 
(2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205.  
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 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 36 
(McTiernan and Jacobs JJ); Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 173-4 
(Gleeson CJ), 198-9 (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ), 206 (Hayne J).  
154
 ALPA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (2005) 224 CLR 322s, 432 (Kirby J). 
155
 Implicit in the system of representative government prescribed by the Constitution is the 
freedom of discussion of political and governmental affairs: Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138-9 (Mason CJ), 149 (Brennan J), 168 (Deane and 
Toohey JJ), 210 (Gaudron J) and 227-8 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 
177 CLR 1, 47-9 (Brennan J), 71-3 (Deane and Toohey JJ) and 94 (Gaudron J). See also 
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 219-220 (McHugh J). In 
Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 legislation that 
prohibited certain types of political advertising during election periods was held to be invalid 
for breaching this principle. In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 legislation 
that made it an offence to use words calculated to bring a member of the Industrial Relations 
Commission into disrepute was held to have breached this principle. 
156
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1999) 189 CLR 520, 566-7. See also 
McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 269 (McHugh J). In McGinty a majority of 
the High Court held that there was no guarantee of ‘one vote, one value’ implied in the 
Constitution. 
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• is not absolute. … [and] will not invalidate a law enacted to satisfy 
some other legitimate end if the law satisfies two conditions;
157
  
• will not apply if the law has an object that is compatible with 
representative and responsible government. If the law is ‘reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to achieving that end’ it will be valid despite 
the implied freedom;
158
  
• is a constraint on legislative power, rather than conferring an 
individual personal right;
159
  
•  ‘is not an obligation to publicise … [I]t is not a right to require 
others to provide a means of communication’:
160
 
• will only apply where there is some relevant ‘right or privilege … 
under the general law’ that is being infringed;
161
 
• does not protect statutory rights as rights created by statute can be 
reduced by statute.
162
 
 
A useful example of this unwillingness to construe these implied protections 
broadly, or to extend them, can be found in the High Court case of Kruger v 
Commonwealth,
163
 discussed above in the context of section 116. The 
Ordinance considered in that case was said to be unconstitutional on a 
number of bases including that it: 
 
• breached section 116 of the Constitution Act 1901 (UK); 
• breached an implied constitutional freedom against being removed 
and detained without the benefit of the due process of law; 
                                                
157
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1999) 189 CLR 520, 567-8.  
158
 Ibid. Note that, as the diversion of thought in the subsequent case Coleman v Power (2004) 
220 CLR 1 evidences, there is considerable uncertainty as to the legal effect of this case. Thus, 
while in this case all justices applied Lange, the High Court was divided 4:3 as to whether the 
subject legislation was inconsistent with the implied freedom of political communication. See 
also Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 305 (Heydon J). 
159
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1999) 189 CLR 520, 567. See also Levy v 
Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 605 (Dawson J), 620 (McHugh J), 628 (Kirby J). More 
generally, in Kruger v Commonwealth the court asserted that a breach of any alleged 
constitutional rights did not give rise to any entitlement to damages: (1997) 190 CLR 1, 46-7 
(Brennan CJ), 93 (Toohey J), 125-6 (Gaudron J), 147 (Gummow J). 
160
 McClure v Australian Electoral Commission (1999) 163 ALR 734, 740-1 (Hayne J); 
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 303 (Heydon J), contra 
267-8 (Kirby J). 
161 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 662; Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission 
(2004) 220 CLR 181, 223 (McHugh J), 298 (Callinan J), 303 (Heydon J), contra 276 (Kirby J). 
162
 Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 223 (McHugh J), 298 
(Callinan J), 305 (Heydon J). 
163
 (1997) 190 CLR 1. See also ALPA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (2005) 224 CLR 322 
as a further example of an unwillingness to expand the implied freedoms. 
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• breached an implied constitutional right of equality under the law; 
and  
• breached an implied constitutional freedom of movement and 
association. 
 
Brennan CJ,
164
 Dawson J
165
 (with whom McHugh J agreed
166
) and Gummow 
J
167
 rejected the existence of the alleged implied constitutional freedoms. In 
regard to the implied requirement of ‘legal equality’, these justices asserted 
that some provisions of the Constitution (sections 51(ii), 51(iii), 51(xix), 51 
(xxvi), 88, 92, 99 and 117) contemplate ‘legislative inequality’.
168
 In regard 
to the implied right to freedom of movement and association, Brennan CJ 
asserted that no ‘such right has hitherto been held to be implied in the 
Constitution and no textual or structural foundation for the implication has 
been demonstrated in this case’.
169
 The judges denied that such a right was a 
‘corollary of that freedom of communication about government and political 
matters which is implied in the Constitution …’
170
  
 
Moreover, as noted above, Brennan CJ
171
 and Dawson J
172
 also held that 
section 122 (the ‘Territories’ power) extended to the Commonwealth an 
absolute legislative power with respect to the Territories that was not subject 
to any express or implied constitutional prohibition. Thus, if the alleged 
implied right to legal equality existed, the Ordinance, which ‘treated 
Aboriginal children differently from other children’ would nevertheless be 
validly enacted under section 122.
173
 Toohey, Gummow and Gaudron JJ 
disagreed on this point, asserting that section 122 was not necessarily 
immune from express (s 116) or implied constitutional protections.
174
 
However, Toohey and Gummow JJ held that if section 122 was subject to the 
                                                
164
 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 46. Brennan CJ found it unnecessary to consider many of the grounds 
put forward by the plaintiffs as he believed the Ordinance (i) was not intended to inflict mental 
harm and (ii) was not intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion. This meant that the 
crux for him was whether s 122 was limited by these constitutional restrictions: 41. 
165
 Ibid 63 and 68-70. Dawson J asserted that the right to due process was procedural in nature 
and thus did not provide a substantive right or freedom: 69. 
166
 Ibid 142-4. 
167
 Ibid 153-9. 
168
 Ibid 45 (Brennan CJ), see also 64 (Dawson J), 155 (Gummow J). 
169
 Ibid 45.  
170
 Ibid 45 (Brennan CJ), see also 155 (Gummow J). 
171
 Ibid 41. Once there was a sufficient connection between the law and the Territories, the 
Territories power was said to be without limitation: 41. 
172
 Ibid 56, 68-70 and 73.  
173
 Ibid 42 (Brennan CJ). 
174
 Ibid 79, 85, 92-3 and 96 (Toohey J), 162 and 166-7 (Gummow J), 114-125 and 141 
(Gaudron J). 
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alleged constitutional rights, the Ordinance had not breached them.
175
 Only 
Gaudron J in her dissent stated a belief that the Ordinance breached the 
implied constitutional freedom of movement and association.
176
 The 
Ordinance conferred powers which directly constrained the freedom of 
movement and association by, for example, requiring Aboriginal persons to 
remain on reserves and by removing Aboriginal children from their families 
and detaining them in Aboriginal institutions.
177
  
 
All indications suggest that this narrowing of any implied constitutional 
protections will continue. Recently retired Justice Callinan has criticised 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
178
 not because of its 
narrowing of the implied constitutional protection, but for its very 
recognition of the implied protection.
179
 Callinan J rejected the existence of 
the implied constitutional freedom of communication, adding that ‘the 
authors of the Constitution were well aware of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and most deliberately must have chosen not 
to incorporate such a provision in our Constitution’.
180
 Not long before his 
appointment to the High Court, Heydon J extra-curially criticised Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation
181
 and ‘judicial activism’ generally as 
the ‘illegitimate’ use of the judicial function to further ‘some political, moral 
or social program’.
182
 
 
Implied constitutional rights will certainly not constitute a set of rights 
obviating the need for a federal bill of rights. Moreover, the courts’ attitude to 
the legal relevance of a breach of both express and implied constitutional 
provisions (ie the inability to seek damages) indicates that, even when 
breached, implied constitutional rights might not provide an adequate remedy 
in a given case. 
 
 
                                                
175
 Ibid 93 and 97 (Toohey J).  
176
 Ibid 127.  
177
 Ibid 128.  
178
 (1999) 189 CLR 520. 
179
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 119, 
330-331; Roberts & Case v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 101-2. See, however, Kirby J’s response: 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 119, 285-
286; Roberts & Case v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 55. 
180
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 119, 
330-331. More generally, see Callinan J’s comments as to the relevance of international 
human rights law in Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 389. 
181
 (1999) 189 CLR 520. 
182
 ‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2003) Jan-Feb Quadrant 9. 
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V THE LACK OF SPECIFICALLY ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
 
Unlike the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
183
 the Commonwealth 
Constitution contains no section protecting Aboriginal rights. In fact the 
Commonwealth Constitution is far from a protective document when it 
comes to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. In addition to section 51(xxxi), 
discussed above, which obviously has a potential impact on the 
extinguishment of Aboriginal title,
184
 three provisions of the Constitution 
were/are relevant to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia; namely sections 25, 
127 and 51(xxvi). 
 
Sections 25 and 127 are interrelated. Section 25 qualifies section 24. The 
latter provides that the House of Representatives is to be ‘chosen in the 
several States … in proportion to the respective numbers of their people’. 
Regarding the calculation of the number of people in a State or in the 
Commonwealth, section 25 provides that if a State law disqualifies a race 
from voting in elections, ‘persons of that race resident in that State shall not 
be counted.’ Thus section 25 accommodated the State disenfranchisement of 
Aboriginal persons under Acts such as the Constitutional Acts Amendment 
Act 1899 (WA) and Elections Act 1885 (Qld)
 
and excluded such persons from 
being taken into account in determining State representation in the House of 
Representatives under section 24. Aboriginal persons were not counted in the 
population of a State when determining the number of seats of Parliament 
that could be held by representatives of that State. Such State 
disenfranchisement meant that Aboriginal persons were also ineligible to vote 
in the referendum that approved the adoption of the Commonwealth 
Constitution.
185
 In this regard it is also pertinent to note the Commonwealth 
disenfranchisement of Aboriginal persons under section 4 of the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth).
186
 Commonwealth 
                                                
183
 In particular the right to use a native language under s 23 and the general protection of 
aboriginal rights under s 35. 
184
 While it has not been conclusively determined, it was suggested in Mabo v Queensland (No 
2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 111 and Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 
513, 613 that s 51(xxxi) applied when aboriginal title was extinguished. Note that the Native 
Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), which allows for, inter alia, the extinguishment of native 
title, provides compensation on ‘just terms’.  
185
 Hanks, above n 34, 91. 
186
 Note that this section was stated to be subject to s 41 of the Constitution, which preserved 
the right to vote in the case of persons with State franchise at federation. Note that it did not 
apply to persons who obtained State franchise post-federation: R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka 
(1983) 152 CLR 254. Section 41 would have served to protect the voting rights of the small 
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disenfranchisement of Aboriginal persons was not completely removed until 
1962 through the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962 (Cth). 
 
Section 25 was in turn bolstered by section 127 which provided that ‘[i]n 
reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or 
other part of the Commonwealth, Aboriginal natives shall not be counted’. 
Thus, under the Constitution, the traditional peoples of Australia were not 
counted as Australians in the census. 
 
Sections 25 and 127 were both based on the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution that excludes ‘Indians not taxed’ from the federal census. 
By way of explanation, the sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples of the 
United States is recognised through a notion called ‘domestic dependent 
sovereignty’. The Indian tribes of the United States have long been 
recognised as domestic dependent Nations, exercising inherent sovereign 
rights over Indian country187 concurrently with the United States 
government’s claim to sovereignty.188 The sovereignty of Indian Nations 
became entrenched in the United States case law as a result of a series of 
cases that have come to be known as the ‘Marshall trilogy’.189 According to 
                                                                                                               
number of aboriginal persons entitled to State franchise at federation: ibid 93. See further the 
discussion at ibid 93-4. 
187
 In essence, Indian country constitutes (i) reservations, (ii) dependent Indian communities 
and (iii) allotments of lands the aboriginal title to which has not been extinguished. See Bates v 
Clark 95 US 204 (1877); Clairmont v US 225 US 551 (1912); Donnelly v US 228 US 243 
(1913); US v Chavez 290 US 357 (1933); In re McCord 151 F Supp 132 (1957); US v Martine 
442 F 2d 1022 (1971); DeCoteau v District County Court 420 US 425 (1975); Indian Country, 
USA Inc v Oklahoma 829 F 2d 967 (1987); California v Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 480 
US 202 (1987); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v Oklahoma Tax Com 
888 F 2d 1303 (1989); Cardinal v US 954 F 2d 359 (1992); US v Sands 968 F 2d 1058 (1992); 
Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v Narragansett Electric Co 878 F Supp 349 (1995); 
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co v Watchman 52 F 3d 1531 (1995); Oklahoma Tax Com v 
Chickasaw Nation; Mustang Production Co v Harrison 94 F 3d 1382; Ute Indian Tribe v Utah 
935 F Supp 1473 (1996); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v City of Sherrill, New York 337 
F 3d 139 (2d Cir, 2003). See also Federal Criminal Code 18 USCA s 1151. See further 
American Jurisprudence 2d (2005) vol 41, [170]-[171]; D Getches and C Wilkinson, Cases 
and Materials on Federal Indian Law (5th ed, 2005) chap 7; F Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law (University of Mexico Press, 2005); www.answers.com/topic/indian-territory; 
www.indianlandtenure.org; www.indiancountry.com; www.historycooperative.org/journals/ 
cp/vol-02/no-01/cheyfitz.hrtm. 
188
 See also Lane v Pueblo of Santa Rosa 249 US 110 (1919); American Vantage Companies 
Inc v Table Mountain Rancheria 292 F 3d 1091 (9th Cir, 2002); US v Long 324 F 3d 475 (7th 
Cir, 2003) Kizis v Morse Diesel Int Inc 206 Conn 46 (2002); Ackerman v Edwards 121 Cal 
App 4th 946 (2004); US v Lara 541 US 193 (2004). 
189
 Johnson v McIntosh 21 US 543, 574 (1923); Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US 1, 16, 17, 
20 and 53 (1831); Worcester v Georgia 31 US 515, 544-5 and 559 (1932).  
2008                                                                     Time for a Federal Bill of Rights? 167 
the ‘Marshall trilogy’, these Indian Nations had to be left in the undisturbed 
possession of their lands, the right to which was only diminished to a limited 
extent by the new sovereign's right of pre-emption.190 It was recognised that 
Indian tribes, as separate Nations, were entitled to govern themselves and 
enforce their own customary laws. This sovereignty allowed Indian Nations 
to regulate affairs within the scope of their territory, exercising authority over 
matters such as community membership, domestic relations between 
members, fish and game resources and taxation,191 and enjoying sovereign 
immunity from suit.192 Hence, the reference to ‘Indians not taxed’ relates to 
those Indian persons living in a self-governing Indian Nation that is not 
subject to federal tax. Thus the 14th Amendment was transplanted into the 
Australian Commonwealth Constitution even though the sovereignty of the 
Aboriginal peoples was not recognised in Australia. 
 
In 1967 section 127 was removed from the Constitution as a consequence of 
one of the few successful referenda on the amendment of the Constitution. 
Thus it was not until 1967 that the Aboriginal peoples of Australia were 
recognised as being Australian persons for the purposes of censuses. Section 
25, however, was not repealed as a result of the 1967 referendum and still 
remains in this form in the Constitution.  
 
                                                
190
 That is, the sole right as against other European nations to purchase the Indians' lands if 
they wish to sell. Marshall CJ described the right of pre-emption in Johnson v McIntosh 21 US 
543, 573 (1923): ‘This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose 
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which 
title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans necessarily 
gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, 
and establishing settlements upon it.’ 
191
 See Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation 439 US 436 
(1979); Montana v US 450 US 544 (1981); Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe 455 US 130 
(1982); Conoco Inc v Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes 569 F Supp 801 (1983); Southland 
Royalty Co v Navajo Tribe of Indians 715 F 2d 486 (1983); Kerr-McGee Corp v Navajo Tribe 
of Indians 731 F 2d 597 (1984); Queets Band of Indians v Washington 765 F 2d 1399 (1985); 
US v Anderson 736 F 2d 1358 (1984); Burlington Northern Railroad v Fort Peck Tribal 
Executive Board 701 F Supp 1493 (1988); Burlington Northern Railway Co v Blackfeet Tribe 
of Blackfeet Indian Reservation 924 F 2d 899 (1991); Atkinson Trading v Shirley 531 US 1009 
(2000); Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co v Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck 
Reservation 323 F 3d 767 (9th Cir, 2003). See further Getches, above n 188, chap 8; Cohen, 
above n 188.  
192
 See In re Absher Children 141 Ohio App 3d 118 (2001); Roe v Doe 649 NW 2d 566 (ND, 
2002); NLRB v Pueblo of San Juan 276 F 3d 1186 (10th Cir 2002); State v Moses 145 Wash 2d 
370 (2002); Atkinson Trading v Shirley 531 US 1009 (2000); Kizis v Morse Diesel Int Inc 206 
Conn 46 (2002); State v Manypenny 682 NW 2d 143 (2004); Sanchez v Santa Ana Golf Club 
Inc 104 P 3d 548 (2004). 
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Section 51(xxvi), known as the ‘races’ power, originally extended to the 
Commonwealth legislative authority over ‘[t]he people of any race, other 
than the Aboriginal race in any state, for whom it is deemed necessary to 
make special laws…’ Thus originally the federal Parliament had no specific 
power to pass laws in regard to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. The 
Commonwealth legislative authority to pass laws dealing with Aboriginal 
persons, such as the Aboriginal Ordinance 1918 (Cth) considered above in 
Kruger v Commonwealth,
193
 was based on the other non-race-specific 
sections of the Constitution. In this case the primary source of legislative 
power was section 122, the ‘Territories’ power. Section 51(xxvi) reflected the 
fact that, historically, Aboriginal affairs were regarded as a State matter. 
Despite federation occurring in 1901 and despite the federal Parliament 
having authority over the Territories from this date,
194
 it was not until 1911 
that the Commonwealth became responsible for the Northern Territory
195
 and 
passed laws regulating the rights and lives of Aboriginal persons, for example 
the Aboriginals Ordinance 1911 (Cth).  
 
In 1967, in the referendum discussed above, section 51(xxvi) was amended 
by deleting the words ‘other than the Aboriginal race in any state’. Thus 
section 51(xxvi) can now be used by the Commonwealth to enact laws 
regarding Aboriginal peoples. Under the Constitution, unless stated 
otherwise, the legislative powers of the federal Parliament, including those 
outlined in section 51(xxvi), are concurrent with the States’ powers. This 
contrasts with the position in the United States and Canada where most 
powers with respect to Aboriginal persons are held exclusively by the federal 
government.
 196
 
 
There have been very few cases on section 51(xxvi) and these cases have 
generally
197
 involved legislation supported by other heads of legislative 
                                                
193
 (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
194
 See Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 122. Note in regard to the Australian Capital Territory 
that under the Aborigines Welfare Act 1954 (Cth) aboriginal persons residing in this Territory 
were subject to any relevant New South Wales legislation. 
195
 The Northern Territory was originally annexed to South Australia and this historical fact 
explains why State legislation applied to the aboriginal peoples of the Northern Territory post-
federation. See, for example, the Northern Territory Aboriginal Act 1910 (SA). 
196
 See United States’ Constitution 1789 Article 1; British North America Act 1869 s 91(24). 
See Hanks, above n 34, 107.  
197
 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 461 concerned s 51(xxvi), but 
also the operation of s 109 in regard to inconsistent Western Australian laws. Controversially, 
in this case the High Court held that the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was not racially 
discriminatory and thus was not contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). See 
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power. Therefore, section 51(xxvi) has not been the sole or primary focus of 
these cases.
198
 The key unresolved issue in regard to section 51(xxvi) is 
whether it can be used to discriminate against Aboriginal persons, rather than 
discriminating in their favour. Murphy J in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen
199
 
and the Tasmanian Dam case
200
 and Brennan
201
 and Deane
202
 JJ in the latter 
case suggested that section 51(xxvi) could only be used to pass laws that 
benefit Aboriginal persons. It was reasoned that the 1967 amendment 
indicated that racially discriminatory policies were to come to an end and the 
‘primary object of the power is beneficial.’
203
 Similarly, Kirby J in Kartinyeri 
v Commonwealth
204
 asserted that the history of section 51(xxvi), including 
the 1967 amendment, indicates that the word ‘for’ was intended to be 
interpreted as ‘for the benefit’. Justice Gaudron
205
 in the same case asserted 
that, to be valid under section 51(xxvi), a law must be ‘appropriate and 
adapted to [a race’s] different circumstances.’
206
 She also asserted that ‘it is 
difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a law presently operating to 
the disadvantage of a racial minority would be valid.’ This was particularly 
so in regard to Aboriginal Australians.
207
  
 
However, there are contrary dicta in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen
208
 and 
Western Australia v Commonwealth.
209
 Such a contrary view was adopted by 
                                                                                                               
further J Clarke, The Native Title Amendment Bill 1997: A Different Order of Uncertainty? 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Discussion Paper 144/97 (1997, ANU). 
198
 Thus in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 and the Tasmanian Dam case 
(1983) 158 CLR 1 the focus was also on the external affairs power and Parliament’s ability to 
enact laws domestically incorporating international conventions. In Koowarta v Bjelke-
Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 five members of the court (Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Stephen, Wilson 
and Brennan JJ; Mason and Murphy JJ not deciding) held that s 51(xxvi) did not support the 
enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). In the Tasmanian Dam case (1983) 
158 CLR 1 a majority of the court (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ) held that s 
51(xxvi) supported provisions of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) 
protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage. 
199
 (1982) 153 CLR 168, 242. 
200
 (1983) 158 CLR 1, 80. 
201
 Ibid 242. 
202
 Ibid 273. 
203
 Ibid 242. 
204
 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 413 and 416. Consequently, he held the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 
1997 (Cth) to be invalid under s 51(xxvi). 
205
 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 363-8. See also Gaudron J in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 
CLR 1. 
206
 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 367.  
207
 Ibid 367-8.  
208
 (1982) 153 CLR 168, 186 (Gibbs J). 
209
 (1995) 183 CLR 373, 461. 
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Gummow and Hayne JJ in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth
210
 and also appears to 
have been supported by Brennan CJ and McHugh J in the same case.
211
 
Under this view, section 51(xxvi) could provide a specific source of power to 
enact legislation that displaces the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth),
212
 
in the manner described above. How disturbing the possibility is that section 
51(xxvi) might be used to pass laws that impact negatively on a race is shown 
by the Solicitor-General’s response to a question from Kirby J in Kartinyeri v 
Commonwealth.
213
 When asked if section 51(xxvi) could be used to validly 
enact Nuremberg-style race laws or South African apartheid laws, the 
Solicitor-General unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative, adding that the 
section gives a power to pass what may be described as ‘inherently a 
discriminatory law’.
214
 
 
The constitutional position of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia is 
abhorrent, both because of the express provisions of the Constitution and the 
absence in it of recognition and protection of Aboriginal rights. Any reform 
involving the adoption of a bill of rights instrument needs to address the 
historical discrimination against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia under 
the Constitution in a number of ways:  
 
First, while the repugnant State legislation disenfranchising Aboriginal 
persons that provided section 25 with its foundations was ultimately repealed, 
in some cases as late as 1965,
215
 it is nevertheless disturbing that section 25 
remains in the Constitution and indirectly condones racist State laws.
216
 As 
                                                
210
 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 382. See also Dawson J in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 
1. 
211
 (1998) 195 CLR 337, 355-357. They asserted that if the Commonwealth had legislative 
authority under s 51(xxvi) to pass the Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), it had power to 
partially repeal that Act. While they did not specifically address whether s 51(xxvi) only 
allowed beneficial laws, as this amendment impacted negatively on the Ngarrindjeri people, 
they must have believed that s 51(xxvi) was not so limited. 
212
 See McHugh, above n 2. 
213
 (1998) 195 CLR 337. 
214
 Quoted in McHugh, above n 2. 
215
 1962 in the case of Western Australia (Electoral Act Amendment Act 1962 (WA)) and 1965 
in the case of Queensland Election Acts Amendment Act 1965 (Qld)). See also Hanks, above n 
34, 87 and 92. 
216
 The validity of any such laws today is another question. Clearly they would breach the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Thus Hanks (ibid 92) notes that the ability of the States 
to impose such racial restrictions has been doubted in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 
CLR 140. 
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suggested by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation,
217
 it should be 
removed from the Constitution. 
 
Second, it must be made clear that section 51(xxvi) cannot be used to 
discriminate against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. As noted earlier, the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) has failed to protect Aboriginal people 
from racially discriminatory legislation and policies. Equally, as Kruger v 
Commonwealth
218
 indicates, constitutional implications do not provide a 
source of protection. Thus an express provision preventing discrimination on 
the basis of race is needed to adequately protect Aboriginal persons. To this 
end, the preamble to the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) 
recognises that the Charter is founded on notions of ‘equality and freedom’ 
and states that ‘human rights belong to all people without discrimination, and 
the diversity of the people of Victoria enhances our community’. Section 8(3) 
of the Victorian Charter also provides that ‘Every person is equal before the 
law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination 
and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination’. 
Sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
and section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also 
address this issue by specifically prohibiting discrimination on the basis of, 
inter alia, race.  
 
Third, the cultural rights of Aboriginal peoples should be expressly 
recognised and protected. Section 19(1) of the Charter of Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) provides that a person with a particular cultural 
background ‘must not be denied the right, in community with other persons 
of that background, to enjoy his or her culture …’
219
 Importantly in this 
context, section 19(2)(a) specifically recognises and protects the cultural 
rights of Aboriginal persons and section 19(2)(c) protects their right to 
‘maintain their kinship ties’. 
 
Fourth, the right of Aboriginal peoples to speak their traditional language 
should be expressly recognised and protected. Again, section 19(1) of the 
Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) provides that a person with 
a particular linguistic background ‘must not be denied the right, in 
community with other persons of that background … to use his or her 
                                                
217
 Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge (Final Report, 2000) www.austlii.edu.au/au/oter/ 
IndigLRes/car/2000/16. 
218
 (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
219
 See also Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 ss 30 and 31; Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZ) s 20. 
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language’
220
 and section 19(2)(b) specifically recognises and protects the 
right of Aboriginal persons to maintain and use their language. More 
controversial is whether a right to education in a traditional language should 
be protected. Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
recognises the rights in regard to primary and secondary school instruction in 
English or French, but does not address Aboriginal languages. Section 29(2) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides that all 
persons have the right to receive education in the language of their choice in 
a public educational institution, where that is ‘reasonably practicable’. 
 
Fifth, a bill of rights instrument might also recognise Aboriginal customary 
law. This issue has been extensively addressed in the ALRC Report, 
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws.
221
 This of course gives rise to 
difficult issues, particularly in the context of criminal law and punishment. At 
least the recognition of customary family law should be considered. It is 
relevant in this context that section 15(3) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 condones legislation that recognises traditional 
marriages and ‘systems of personal and family law under any tradition’. 
However, the recognition of such traditions must be consistent with the rest 
of the provisions of the South African Constitution.  
 
Sixth, Aboriginal rights, including land rights, should be recognised and 
protected. As noted above, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) has not 
been effective in protecting Aboriginal land rights. In this regard section 
19(1) of the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) provides some 
guidance in its recognition of the right of Aboriginal persons to ‘maintain 
their distinctive spiritual, material and economic relationship with the land 
and waters and other resources with which they have a connection under 
traditional laws and customs’. More generally, section 35(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognises and affirms the ‘Aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada’.  
 
Finally, it would be appropriate to recognise the Aboriginal peoples of 
Australia as the traditional owners of the country. To this end the preamble of 
the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) recognises the special 
importance of human rights for the ‘Aboriginal people of Victoria, as 
descendants of Australia's first people, with their diverse spiritual, social, 
cultural and economic relationship with their traditional lands and waters’. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
 
From the above analysis it will be apparent that the Commonwealth 
Constitution contains hollow avowals of human rights. It contains very few 
human rights provisions and, where the constitutional drafters did purport to 
protect a right, judicial interpretation has narrowed the right exceedingly. The 
four key so-called protections considered in this article particularly exemplify 
this proposition. As the above critical analysis shows, all four provisions 
have been emasculated by judicial interpretations, supported to some extent 
by poor constitutional drafting. It must be accepted that the narrow view of 
these sections is largely supported by the majority justices of, in particular, 
the High Court of Australia. These constitutional provisions, despite often 
being founded upon the United States’ Constitution, do not provide an 
effective source of human rights protections in Australia. Equally, the courts 
will not use the Constitution as a source of implied constitutional rights. The 
paucity of rights in the Constitution, coupled with the inadequacy of any 
other sources of human rights in Australia, suggests that a new source of 
rights is needed – a federal bill of rights.  
 
It must be recognised, however, that the analysis in this article is part of a 
broader debate as to whether Australia should adopt a federal bill of rights. 
That the Constitution provides a weak source of human rights does not 
conclusively establish the need for a federal bill of rights. This article 
comprises just one component in the discussion of whether the people of 
Australia need a federal bill of rights. Thus, it is pertinent to conclude by 
briefly placing the article in the context of the arguments for and against such 
a bill of rights.  
 
Until now the case against an Australian bill of rights has largely been based 
on the notion that a bill of rights will confer on the unelected judiciary 
legislative and executive powers, contrary to democratic principles.
222
 
However, under a legislative bill of rights the courts are typically only given 
the power to declare that legislation is contrary to the stated protections.
223
 
Only the legislature can actually invalidate a law. As discussed below, the 
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Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) accords with such 
a model. 
 
Opponents of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) 
nevertheless continue to assert that it confers too much power on unelected 
judges.
224
 Perhaps blind to the reality of the operation of the Charter, they 
continue to assert that the Victorian courts can effectively strike down a law 
that breaches human rights and that this capacity effects a revolutionary ‘shift 
in the balance of power between the elected Parliament and the unelected 
judges’.
225
 This is a considerable overstatement of the courts’ powers under 
the Charter. Under section 36 of the Charter the Supreme Court of Victoria 
or Victorian Court of Appeal can declare that a statute is incompatible with a 
human right. The declaration does not invalidate the statute, nor give rise to 
any civil cause of action in an aggrieved person: sections 36(5) and 39(3). 
Section 36 confers a power of judicial review, but nothing more. As stated 
above, the ability to amend or repeal the law continues to reside solely with 
Parliament. 
 
It has also been contended that a bill of rights will lead to a litigation 
culture.
226
 However, the barriers to litigation, such as costs and locus standi, 
will help prevent vexatious litigation. For this reason, in the United Kingdom 
there was almost no increase in litigation following the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) was raised 
in less than .05% of criminal cases heard in the Crown Court following its 
enactment. Indeed, most of the cases referred to in the recent British Review 
of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act (2006) did not go to court.
227
  
Moreover, a legislative bill of rights typically does not extend private rights 
of action. Thus, while, as noted above, under section 36 of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) the Supreme Court of Victoria 
or Court of Appeal can declare that a statute is incompatible with a human 
right, the declaration does not give rise to any civil cause of action in an 
aggrieved person: sections 36(5) and 39(3).
228
 
 
Interrelated with the above is the suggestion that a bill of rights will have the 
effect of making judges ‘more activist’ because, it is stated, Parliament is no 
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longer supreme.
229
 It is said that the power to declare laws incompatible with 
human rights will reflect individual judges’ personal and political views and 
this will politicise the bench.
230
 Implicit in this is the suggestion that the 
declaratory powers under the Charter are somehow more ‘powerful’ than the 
courts’ existing powers to invalidate laws where these laws, for example, 
breach constitutional law. Respectfully, how such a declaratory power is 
going to politicise the bench is far from clear. Moreover, the British 
experience suggests that such a claim is without empirical foundation.
231
 
Ultimately, if a court declares an Act to breach a fundamental human right 
and the government responds to this through an amendment, how is that 
undemocratic? Is that not a positive feature of the bill of rights?
232
 
 
It has also been suggested that it is naive to believe that a bill of rights will 
eliminate human rights abuses through legislative and executive actions, as 
bills of rights have existed in the past in oppressive regimes.
233
 Contemporary 
events have shown, however, that the United States’ Bill of Rights of 1791 
has provided effective protection against government abuse and, as stated 
above, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) was the impetus for the United 
Kingdom Parliament amending, inter alia, its anti-terrorist laws and securing 
the release of English Guantanamo Bay detainees.
234
 Equally, in the absence 
of a federal bill of rights in Australia, as noted above, human rights abuses in 
Australia have been committed by the federal government.  
 
In regard to the framework that such a federal bill of rights might take, 
should it be constitutional or legislative in nature? A constitutional model 
provides a more enduring source of protection of human rights as the 
Constitution cannot be readily amended.
235
 On the other hand, constitutional 
models are criticised as being frozen in time and thus unable to adapt to a 
changing society.
236
 They are seen as too inflexible because of the state’s 
inability to readily amend their terms.
237
 In this regard it is interesting to 
consider how current the protections under the United States’ Bill of Rights 
are, despite their having been adopted in 1791. For the reasons delineated, 
                                                
229
 See McHugh, above n 2. 
230
 See ibid. 
231
 See Department of Constitutional Affairs, above n 228;von Doussa, above n 12. 
232
 See K Kissane, ‘Exerting a moral force’ The Age 8 January 2008. 
233
 Anderson, above n 3. 
234
 Department of Constitutional Affairs, above n 228. See von Doussa, above n 12. 
235
 See McHugh, above n 2. 
236
 See ibid. 
237
 See the discussion of this issue in Cassin, above n 2; Nguyen, above n 223. In response, it is 
interesting to consider the currency of the protections under the United States’ Bill of Rights. 
          DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                   
VOLUME 13 NO 2 
176
legislative models are often seen as having a number of preferable features; 
in particular their ability to be amended more readily than a constitutional 
provision.
238
 As noted above, constitutional models are also perceived as 
extending to the judiciary too much power, contrary to democratic principles. 
It has been suggested, however, that the impartial courts are better placed to 
protect the rights of the marginalised members of society as parliaments lack 
the time, expertise and political will to protect such members of society.
239
 
 
A further issue relating to the model of the relevant bill of rights is the 
question already raised above, namely whether the courts should have power 
to invalidate legislation that breaches the rights in question. As noted above, 
under a legislative bill of rights the courts are typically given the power to 
declare that legislation is contrary to the stated protections, but only the 
legislature can actually invalidate the laws.
240
 This model has the benefit of 
avoiding the above-discussed perception of a judicial usurpation of 
Parliament’s legislative power. It has been effective in the United Kingdom 
where Parliament has responded to judicial declarations by modifying the 
offending laws.
241
 Only time will tell whether judicial ‘shaming’ of the 
Victorian Parliament will suffice and whether it would be preferable for the 
courts to have power to invalidate contrary legislation, as under the United 
States’ Bill of Rights. 
 
Thus this article must be seen in the broader context of the many entwined 
issues that need to be considered in the debate regarding the pros and cons of 
a federal bill of rights. 
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